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Executive Summary 
 
 This paper provides an analysis of the United Nations Security Council compliance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the effectiveness of its Responsibility to Protect innocent 
civilians from crimes committed against them, particularly within the Syrian region in the 
Middle East. The following research examines the possible political obstacles that may have 
been challenging the Council in carrying out its duties and responsibilities in maintaining 
international peace and security. According to studies conducted by different scholars, the 
Security Council has failed to maintain international peace and security in different occasions in 
the past. The most prominent examples are the 1948 Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the 1990 
genocide in Rwanda, and today the Security Council is failing to play its role again in Syria. This 
lack of action since 2011 has resulted in the most extreme refugee crisis in the 21st century.  
 The research focuses on two arguments. The first argument is on intervention versus the 
veto power in the Council, the second argument focuses on non-intervention versus human rights 
violations. This analysis suggests that the Security Council needs reform in order to meet its 
obligations and function effectively in world crises. In order to achieve this, the research 
proposes multiple reform recommendations that could be implemented immediately within the 
system. In addition, this paper includes my own observation from my summer internship (June – 
August 2015) at the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in 
New York. The observation is based on my presence in several Security Council and United 
Nations General Assembly Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) meetings 
relating to various topics on world crises, international peace and security, human rights, and 
peacekeeping. 
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Introduction  
 
 Studies and recent events have shown that the Security Council (SC), as an executive 
organ of the United Nations (UN), has failed in multiple occasions to carry out its duties and 
responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. Hence, its role as the most 
powerful United Nations body is questionable. This paper aims to analyze the United Nations 
Security Council compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and the effectiveness of its 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) innocent civilians from crimes committed against them, 
particularly by using the Syrian refugee crisis of March 2011 as a case study. Also, this paper 
discusses the possible political obstacles that may have been challenging the Security Council in 
carrying out its duties by re-examining the veto politics and mapping the Member States votes in 
the Security Council. This study focuses on two arguments. The first argument is on the Security 
Council intervention in Syria versus the veto power in the Council, the second argument focuses 
on the Security Council non-intervention in Syria versus human rights violations.  
 Therefore, this paper studies interviews and statements accessed from the United Nations 
news center with officials such as UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees Filippo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein 
and UN Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura. Scholarly journals and books, news articles, UN 
Charter, UN meetings coverage, UN audiovisuals, UN diaries from the field, and Security 
Council press releases are referenced, in addition; communication tools such as charts, graphs 
and photos will be used to support the argument of this text. Furthermore, this paper aims to 
propose some democratic reforms that could be implemented in the Security Council to ensure 
prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security. Lastly, this 
paper includes my own observation from my summer internship (June-August 2015) at the 
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Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New York. The 
observation is based on my presence in several Security Council and UN General Assembly 
Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) meetings relating to various topics on 
world crises, international peace and security, human rights, and peacekeeping. 
Background 
 The United Nations is the largest legitimate international organization that is 
constitutionally dedicated to maintaining peace and preventing war.1 The United Nations is not 
only a diplomatic forum, but also a security maintaining institution.2 Since the establishment of 
the UN, the Security Council has been known as the most important UN body and the world’s 
most powerful institution;3 it is compromised of the Permanent Five (P-5) and the Non-
permanent Ten (N-10) that not only speaks and decides on behalf of the 193 UN Member States, 
but also ratifies legally binding resolutions.4 The N-10 members are elected by the General 
Assembly to a two-year non-renewable term. These seats are selected regionally to ensure 
representation in the Council, such that three members are from Africa, two members each from 
Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, and one member from Eastern Europe.5 The P-5 members 
are the victors of the Second World War: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United 
States.6 These five permanent members make up the core of the Security Council and therefore, 
are conferred with veto power, which allows any one member to veto or overrides any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Friedrichs, Gordon. Smart Security Council?: Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. n.p: Hamburg, 
Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing. (2013), 33. Ignacio: USF Libraries Catalog, EBSCOhost. Accessed 
February 20, 2016. 
2 Ibid., 35. 
3 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014), 65. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016.  
4 Friedrichs, Gordon. Smart Security Council?: Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. n.p: Hamburg, 
Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, (2013), 36. Ignacio: USF Libraries Catalog, EBSCOhost. Accessed 
February 20, 2016. 
5 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014), 66. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
6 “Those states had made major contributions to securing military victory in the Second World War.” (Brownlie, 
1963; Oludoun, 2014).  
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resolutions or decisions proposed by the Council regardless the majority’s perspective. 
Additionally, the Security Council has the absolute right to determine what constitutes a threat to 
peace and security.7 Chapter V, Article 24 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations on functions 
and powers states: 
“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
Security Council acts on their behalf.”8  
In 2005, world leaders at the United Nations World Summit embraced a new doctrine 
called the “Responsibility to Protect”, which acknowledges that the responsibility of protecting 
human rights and innocent civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity9 belonged first to the nations in which violations occurred, but when nations 
failed to protect such rights from mass atrocities, the international community could take on the 
responsibility itself.10 Here, it is important to note that the United Nations Security Council is 
tasked with keeping the peace among nations through negotiations, sanctions, or military power. 
Chapter VII, Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations on governing the use of force states: 
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Friedrichs, Gordon. Smart Security Council?: Analyzing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. n.p: Hamburg, 
Germany: Anchor Academic Publishing, (2013), 37. Ignacio: USF Libraries Catalog, EBSCOhost. Accessed 
February 20, 2016. 
8 United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, Article 24 (1).” UN. (June 1945). Accessed January 
30, 2016. http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html 
9 General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” A/RES/60/1. United Nations. (October 2005). Accessed 
March 10, 2016. https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement 
10 Zifcake, Spencer. “The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria.” Melbourne Journal of International Law. 
no. 1 (2012), 59. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed April 1, 2016. 
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complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.”11 
 However, if the Security Council considers that the measures indicated in Article 41 
could be ineffective by any means considering the situation in hand Chapter VII, Article 42 of 
the Charter of the United Nations on governing the use of power authorizes the United Nations 
Security Council to:  
“Take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,  blockade, and 
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”12  
Nonetheless, scholars have questioned the Council’s compliance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the effectiveness of its Responsibility to Protect, particularly in the case of 
the Syrian Arab Republic region in the Middle East. 
Case Study: Syrian Refugee Crisis 
 The conflict in Syria started in 2011 with anti-government protests, which initially 
demanded the release of some teenagers who had been arrested for painting revolutionary 
slogans on a school wall demanding democracy.13 14 Instead of meeting the people’s demands, 
government forces opened fire on protesters, killing most of them. This violent action by the 
government forces generated nationwide demonstrations demanding not only democracy, but 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 41. UN. (June 1945). Accessed January 30, 
2016. http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html. 
12 Ibid., Article 42. 
13 Rodgers, Lucy, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare. "Syria: The Story of the Conflict." BBC News. 
(March 2016). Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
14 Abboud, Samer. “How Syria Fell to Pieces.” Current History 114, no. 776 (December 2015): 337-342. Political 
Science Complete, EBSCOhost.  
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also President Bashar al-Assad’s resignation.15 This violence then, deteriorated into a civil war 
between those for and against Assad, who succeeded his father, former President Hafez al-Assad, 
in 2000. 16  Investigations conducted by the United Nations Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has proven that all parties to the conflict 
have committed war crimes, including and not restricted to “murder, torture, rape and enforced 
disappearances.”17 In addition, all parties have been accused of violating international human 
rights law by using innocent civilians as a method of war through depriving them from food, 
water, and health services.18  
 Since the internal conflict began in Syria, and despite reports on continued violence, 
aggression, killings, and humanitarian crises, the United Nations Security Council has been 
unable to implement multiple proposed resolutions to maintain international peace and security. 
In addition, several peace talks have failed, including Geneva Conference II and Geneva 
Conference III on Syria, due to lack of agreement among involved parties.19 Many scholars have 
argued that this prolonged civil war and insecurity in Syria has created a solid recruiting ground 
for extremist militant groups and paved the way for the presence of terrorist groups such as 
Hezbollah, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Jabhat al- Nusra (Nusra Front), 
and other Al-Qaeda affiliates,20 which created a bigger fraction in the internal conflict and the 
region. In addition, inaction by the international community to stop the war has led to the largest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Rodgers, Lucy, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare. "Syria: The Story of the Conflict." BBC News. 
(March 2016). Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 
16 Ibid. 
17"Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic." Commission of Inquiry. 
OHCHR. Accessed April 09, 2016. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17020&LangID=E 
18 Ibid. 
19 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014), 73. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
20 Jenkins, Brian M. “The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War.” Rand Corporation. Accessed April 1, 2016. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf. 
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displacement crisis globally in a generation21 or as the European Commission describes it “the 
world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War II.”22 According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 7.6 million people are internally displaced in Syria and 
4.3 million people are refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq 
and Egypt.23  
 In addition, others are considered “guests”, “workers” or “brothers and sisters in distress” 
in the Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates; this is because the Gulf countries are not signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol therefore, Syrians are not registered as 
“refugees.”24 Also, many Gulf scholars have argued that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries consider refugees as guests to preserve their dignity and identity. 25  In fact, a 
government source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia said, 
“the Kingdom has received 2.5 million Syrians since the beginning of the conflict”,26 he also 
stated that the Kingdom have adopted a policy that does not treat the Syrian “brothers and 
sisters” as refugees or place them in refugee camps to ensure their safety and preserve their 
dignity. In addition, the Kingdom allows the Syrian brothers and sisters to move around the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 UNHCR. "UNHCR Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan." 
UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. (December 2014). Accessed February 15, 2016. 
https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees.  
22 European Commission. "Syria Crisis." (March 2016). Accessed April 10, 2016. 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf.  
23 UNHCR. "UNHCR Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan." 
UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. (December 2014). Accessed February 15, 2016. 
https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees. 
24 Kayaoğlu, Barın. "Why the Gulf Isn't to Blame for Syrian Refugee Crisis.” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle 
East. (September 2015). Accessed February 25, 2016.  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/syria-
gulf-countries-respond-criticism-over-refugees.html. 
25 Ibid. 
26 MOFA. "MOFA Official Source: The Kingdom Receives around 2.5 M. Syrians, since the Outbreak of the Crisis, 
Official." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accessed April 09, 2016. 
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/m/en/info/Pages/viewarticle.aspx?pageurl=/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/Mi
nistryNews/Pages/ArticleID2015913123317975.aspx.  
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country and grant legal residency status to those who wish to remain in Saudi Arabia. The 
government source indicates that residency status provides the Syrians the “right to receive free 
medical care, join the labor market and attend schools and universities.”27 According to Saudi 
government statistics, there are more than 100,000 Syrian students in public schools and 
universities are instructed to incorporate about 3,000 Syrian students.28 Furthermore, according 
to The National newspaper, the United Arab Emirates has received about 100,000 Syrians since 
the conflict started in 2011.29 As of 2015 the United Arab Emirates government statistical studies 
indicate a total of a quarter million Syrians reside in the country.30 The government also stated 
that the Syrian case is a priority in the nation’s foreign policy and therefore, the United Arab 
Emirates will continue working with its partners domestically and internationally to address the 
issue in a “sustainable and humane fashion.”31 Here, it is important to note that such claims by 
government officials may be skeptical sometimes.  
 With the increase of human rights violations and abuses in the context of widespread 
insecurity and in disregard of international law, international humanitarian law, and human rights 
law,32 more Syrians are fleeing their country. Scholars have argued that what originally served, 
for Syrian refugees as transitory migration and irregular migration, is now becoming forced 
migration, as the countries closest to the borders of Syria are reaching and, in some cases, have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Kayaoğlu, Barın. "Why the Gulf Isn't to Blame for Syrian Refugee Crisis.” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle 
East. (September 2015). Accessed February 25, 2016.  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/syria-
gulf-countries-respond-criticism-over-refugees.html. 
28 MOFA. "MOFA Official Source: The Kingdom Receives around 2.5 M. Syrians, since the Outbreak of the Crisis, 
Official." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Accessed April 09, 2016. 
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/m/en/info/Pages/viewarticle.aspx?pageurl=/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/Mi
nistryNews/Pages/ArticleID2015913123317975.aspx. 
29 "100,000 Syrians Move to UAE since 2011." The National. (September 2015). Accessed March 29, 2016. 
http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/100000-syrians-move-to-uae-since-2011. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014): 63. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
!!
9!
!
reached, their maximum capacity for the number of individuals they are able to take in.33 34 35 In 
spite of this, many of those who are allowed to stay are not able to obtain formal housing within 
those countries, forced to live in tent cities made up of whatever materials are made available to 
them36. As these nations are forced to turn others away, the migration path of Syrian refugees 
away from their homes become even longer, as they are forced to continue further away from 
home. According to Al-monitor, a Bahraini analyst said Syrians find it easier to flee to Europe 
rather than the Gulf because the Gulf States do not share land borders with Syria, unlike Turkey, 
Jordan and Lebanon and different from Europe, Gulf States are not accessible via the 
Mediterranean.37  
 Unlike Jordan, Lebanon and the GCC countries, European States are signatories to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol and therefore have 
legal obligations toward refugees, Article 1 (A)(2) of the Convention, states:  
 “A refugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
 of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
 is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
 to avail himself of the protection of that country…”38  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Gokalp Aras, N. Ela, and Zeynep Sahin Mencutek. "The International Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus: The 
Case of Syrian Refugee Crisis and Turkey." Migration Letters 12, no. 3 (September 2015), 193-208. Academic 
Search Index, EBSCOhost. Accessed March 15, 2016. 
34 Ihlamur-Öner, Suna Gülfer. "Turkey's Refugee Regime Stretched to the Limit? The Case of Iraqi and Syrian 
Refugee Flows." Perception: Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (September 2013), 191-228. Political 
Science Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 10, 2016. 
35 Mercy Corps. "Quick Facts: What You Need To Know About The Syria Crisis". Mercy Corps, (2016). Accessed 
March 30, 2016. http://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-facts-what-you-need-
know-about-syria-crisis. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Kayaoğlu, Barın. "Why the Gulf Isn't to Blame for Syrian Refugee Crisis.” Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle 
East. (September 2015). Accessed February 25, 2016.  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/syria-
gulf-countries-respond-criticism-over-refugees.html.!
38 "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1 (A)(2)." UNHCR News, (2012). Accessed 
March 29, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.  
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 Article 31 (1) of the Convention permits any individual who meets the above definition to 
enter any of the 150 countries that are signatories to the Convention without authorization.39 
Also, Article 33 (1) of the Convention does not allow those countries to “expel or return” a 
refugee to their country of origin.40 For this reason, Mark Bixler and Michael Martinez argue, 
“the number of Syrians seeking safety in Europe has more than doubled in the past year. In fact, 
many refugees have left Turkey and other countries through the Mediterranean sea to Europe 
seeking “asylum” – status that allows someone to live and work legally in another country.”41 
Moreover, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 14 (1) states:  
 “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
 persecution.”42 
 Despite the refugee crisis, the conflict in Syria rages on seemingly unchecked, with the 
Russian Federation backing the Assad regime. Notwithstanding criticism from all quarters, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to bomb areas, killing not only terrorist militant 
groups and its supporters but also many innocent civilians in the process. The refugee situation 
from Syria has become a global pandemic, with some countries in Europe straining to absorb the 
thousands fleeing the conflict and politicians in the United States argue over whether to take 
refugees in, many insisting that in doing so the United States invites ISIS supporters to enter 
under the guise of refugee status. In short, the situation in Syria has become so desperate there 
seems to be no feasible resolution in sight. The natural response then is to question why the UN 
Security Council has failed so far to intervene in the conflict. The answer lies buried in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39!"Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 31 (1)." UNHCR News, (2012). Accessed 
March 29, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf.!
40 Ibid., Article 33 (1).  
41 Bixler, Mark, and Michael Martinez. "Migrant and Refugee Crisis: War Uproots 1 in 2 Syrians." CNN. 
(September 2015). Accessed March 15, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/11/world/syria-refugee-crisis-when-
war-displaces-half-a-country/.  
42 "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights | United Nations." UN News Center. Accessed April 10, 2016. 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.  
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complex tangle of the stated responsibilities of the Council versus conflicting political and 
economic realities.43  
Intervention vs. Veto power 
 Although the Charter of the United Nations urge a quick response by the Security 
Council to threat to international peace and security,44 many scholars have found the Council to 
remain ineffective and perhaps corrupt. Here, it is important to understand the veto politics in the 
Council. The establishment of the veto was implemented at the formation of the United Nations 
itself in 1945,45 when the former Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion of veto powers – 
recognizing that western interests might often run in opposition to its own. Throughout the Cold 
War in 1947-1991, the United States and the Soviet Union used their vetoes to block decisions 
that favored one another and to ensure that actions against their interests did not occur. Today by 
mapping out the veto politics in the Council, one can see that while the United States has largely 
backed away from using its veto power, the Russian Federation continues to use its power to 
block actions that deems beneficial to the United States, but disadvantageous to its own domestic 
interests. According to the UN Security Council report of 2015, “the veto has been used in 
relation to a variety of situations in which human rights concerns featured prominently”46, and it 
has prevented the Council from acting against human rights abuses and international crises.  
Russia is not the only problem when addressing the Syrian situation, there are many state 
and non-state actors who are involved in the conflict as well, however Russia’s actions are the 
most obvious in the Security Council. In order to understand Russia’s veto politics in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 The situation of Syrian guests and or refugees in the Gulf, Europe and North America is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For more information on the subject please refer to appendix. 
44 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014), 63-96. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
45 Security Council. "The Veto." (October 2015), 2. Accessed April 1, 2016.  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9}/research_report_3_the_veto_2015.pdf. 
46 Ibid., 3. 
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Council, it is important to compare the situation in Libya to the situation in Syria. According to 
Eugene Ivanov, the Russian decision not to veto Resolution 197347 that aimed to establish a no-
fly zone over Libya is because “Russia simply did not have so much at stake in Libya to risk 
finding itself on the periphery of the Russia-NATO dialogue on the most important national 
security issue; the European missile defense discussion”48 that was discussed at the time. In 
addition, Russia did not want to be held accountable for the many civilian deaths; this was 
reflected in the statement of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, “All that is going on in 
Libya is connected with outrageous behavior of Libya’s authorities and the crimes that were 
completely against their own people. We must not forget about it. Everything else is simply a 
consequence.”49 Ivanov argues that this is just a “vintage example of the pragmatism in the 
Russian foreign policy.”50 This action by Russia, allowed the UN-mandated intervention in 
Libya51 that was led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).52 Here, the Security 
Council had acted effectively to address danger to civilians and had, it seemed, prevented 
atrocities. However, it failed in establishing a concrete transitional government in Libya.53   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 “S/RES/1973.” (March 2011). Accessed April 1, 2016. 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf 
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51 “Resolution 1973 in March 2011 established a no-fly zone and the taking of ‘all necessary measures … to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ in Libya.” This was the first time in history the UN 
mandated military intervene in a sovereign state against the express will of its government (Morris, 2013), 1271.!!
52 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged the UN-mandated intervention in Libya as a “coming of age” 
of the UN Security Council “Responsibility to Protect” (Morris, 2013). 
53 Morris, Justin. “Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swining pendulum.” International Affairs. (2013), 
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Nevertheless, after the Security Council acted in Libya, Russia’s diplomatic stance 
towards the military implementation mandate became increasingly critical. 54  Now, in the 
situation of Syria the issue is much more complicated. In fact, even as the United Nations was 
averting a crisis in Libya, Justin Morris observes it began to turn its attention to Syria, where UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned there would be a “test of our common humanity.” He 
told the international community to remember that its greatest failure was, “a reluctance to act in 
the face of serious threats.” This reluctance, he said, too often resulted in “a loss of lives and 
credibility that haunt us ever after”.55 
Taking into consideration the Syrian crisis, the consensus among scholars is that the 
Russian and Chinese veto is the main political obstacle that is restricting the Security Council 
from intervening and stopping the civil war in Syria. The two nations view Syria as a strategic 
ally in the Middle East and as such would veto any resolutions proposed by the Council to end 
the conflict in Syria.56 For instance, according to UN Security Council voting records, between 
2011 and 2015, Russia has vetoed Security Council draft resolutions on Syria four times. 
Similarly, China used its veto power four times, in every time acting with Russia (see table 
below).57 58  
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55 Morris, Justin. “Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swining pendulum.” International Affairs. (2013),  
1265. Accessed January 30, 2016. 
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Draft Resolution Date Description 
S/2011/61259 4 October 2011 Resolution condemned the Syrian crackdown on 
protestors.  
S/2012/7760 4 February 2012 Resolution condemned the violence in Syria. 
S/2012/53861 19 July 2012 Resolution affirming sanctions on Syria if violence 
continues. 
S/2014/34862 22 May 2014 Resolution affirming referral of Syria to ICC.63  
 
It is evident that the Russian Federation has been diplomatically shielding the Syrian 
Arab Republic, even in the face of a humanitarian crisis for several reasons. According to David 
W. Lesch, the alliance between Russia and Syria goes back to the Cold War, when Damascus 
was supported by and allied with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The 
economic, military and political relationship between the two nations has continued into the 
present day.64 Moscow and Damascus therefore have strong interests in maintaining close 
economic and political ties. They also share many commercial interests. Lesch notes that 
Russia’s investment in Syria’s energy and tourism industries in 2009 totaled more than $19 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Security Council, “S/2011/612.” (October 2011). Accessed May 1, 2016.  
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60 Security Council, “S/2012/77.” (February 2012). Accessed May 1, 2016.  
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%2077.pdf 
61 Security Council, “S/2012/538.” (July 2012). Accessed May 1, 2016. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
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62 Security Council, “S/2014/348.” (May 2014). Accessed May 1, 2016. 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
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63 ICC: International Criminal Court. 
64 Lesch, David W. Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad. New Haven: Yale University Press. (January 2012), 136. 
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billion.65 Furthermore, after Russia lost billions of dollars due to the overthrow of President 
Muammar al-Gadafi in Libya and the implementation of new Iranian sanctions, Russia began 
focusing on selling more weapons to Syria, which has become Russia’s seventh biggest weapon 
buyer. Lesch argues that Syria is important to Russia geographically because it is home to 
Russia’s last Mediterranean naval base – located in the port city of Tartous. In addition, he notes 
that China has also invested economic interests in Syria, which has become the nation’s third-
largest importer.66 
Roy Allison, on the other hand, argues that the shared history between Russia and Syria 
cause little other than a feeling of nostalgia and that Syria is not as crucial to Russia’s economic 
interests as some scholars believe. Instead, what is behind Russia’s firm support of Syria is 
politics.67 One of the main reasons Russia has resisted calls to demand the overthrow of Assad is 
that it sees such demands as an imposition of western desires over national sovereignty. Allison 
suggests that if Russia were to give in to such demands, it would set a precedent, which could 
mean domestic turmoil in Russia if the Council were to demand a Russian regime change or 
regime change in another country that is vital to Russia’s political or economic interests.68 
Russia’s reasons behind supporting Assad, then, are not only to support its commercial interests, 
but also to oppose what it sees as western overreach and advance its agenda against the United 
States agenda.  
In regard to the veto, Amnesty International argues that the Security Council’s biggest 
failure is not bypassing Russia and China’s veto on the resolution to refer the situation in Syria to 
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the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC)69, which was the “only way that would 
have made this referral possible.”70 Also, Amnesty International criticizes the Council for 
disregarding their call for this referral as well as calls by the UN-mandated Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and dozens of UN Member 
States and numerous Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s).71  
In addition, Ban Ki-moon has acknowledged that the Security Council is absent of its 
power to intervene in Syria due to the disagreement among the P-5 members, which have 
extremely complicated the issue and resulted in the biggest refugee crisis in a generation.72 In an 
interview with The Guardian on September 7, 2015 Ban Ki-moon said, “We need some 
solidarity, unity of purpose, particularly among the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, when they are divided, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to deliver. That is 
why I’ve been urging the members of the Security Council to look beyond national interest. We 
have to look for the global interest. When the Security Council members are united we have seen 
very speedy and tremendous impact in addressing the issues.”73 Ban Ki-moon also expressed his 
worries on the vetoed resolution by Russia and China in 2014 to refer the Syrian civil conflict for 
further investigation by the International Criminal Court. He said, “The Syrian people have a 
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fundamental right to justice” and this blockage is paralyzing the UN and its “credibility had 
suffered as a result.”74 
Also, the United States has accused Russia of threatening the UNSC’s legitimacy, by the 
latter’s use of a pocket veto towards proposed UN actions – that is the threat of a veto, which can 
influence other nations even when an actual veto is not used.75 According to The Guardian, “The 
Security Council faces a crisis caused by its paralysis over Syria. It has failed to agree concerted 
action to try to stem the bloodshed, even after more than 220,000 Syrians have died and more 
than 11 million have been forced from their homes.”76 The problem, suggests The Guardian, is 
that “Russia has used its veto powers four times to block resolutions on Syria that Moscow sees 
as damaging to its ally.” It has also used its veto power to prevent the Security Council from 
taking action in Ukraine, where it has annexed Crimea and taken military action in support of 
separatists.77 
  Similarly, Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum acknowledge that the UN Security Council 
is a better body than any other to authorize “military intervention for human protection 
purposes”; however, they suggest that it has many weaknesses.78 First, they note it has been 
persistently criticized for its inaction. In many cases, they say, it has been unable to make 
decisions about threats or wars – either because member nations lacked interest in certain affairs 
or because of the threat of vetoes from other nations. They note that the UN Security Council has 
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also been hampered by intelligence failures, weak assessments, trouble agreeing on appropriate 
military actions, and corruption and weak control of operations.79 They further suggest that the 
Council has been bogged down by issues that it should not have to deal with. The result of these 
weaknesses has often been “deplorable handling” of security situations.80 
Sahar Okhovat observes that the UNSC system has been criticized for years – largely 
because of its undemocratic structure. Critics, she says, have mainly leveled their criticism at the 
Council’s veto power, which allows powerful members to “quash” any action that is not in their 
national interests – no matter how much demand there may be for it in other nations. Okhovat 
also notes that the P-5 nations influence other nations to vote in certain ways because they have a 
“pocket veto”.81 Similarly, Jussi Hanhimaki argues that the right of veto has “complicated the 
UNSC’s work more than any other issue. He states that the idea of five nations holding a more 
powerful position than any of the UN’s 193 nations is “absurd” and suggests that the body is 
often “paralyzed” when only one of the five nations disagree on a resolution.82 
 Moreover, scholars such as Temitope Oludoun argues that there have been criticisms not 
only concerning the structure of the Council, but also about the reputation of the P-5 members, 
whose actions sometimes violate the principles of the UN Charter.83 Likewise, Michael Barnett 
argues that the Security Council has “little interest in the civilian killings”84 since it failed to 
protect innocent people from dying in multiple occasions in the past. The most prominent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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examples are the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian crisis, which killed thousands of Palestinian civilians 
and reduced the population of the state of Palestine85 and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda – that 
killed about one million Rwandans86, and now history seems to be repeating itself in the case of 
the Syrian crisis. Others like Barry O'Neill are concerned primarily with the lack of equity in the 
Council since only a handful of states are granted such sweeping powers or in other words the 
veto power.87 It is significant that the present permanent members represent the world's dominant 
powers today, however the question of equity remains important. 
On the other hand, other scholars see purpose in the veto. Some suggest that it does not 
make sense for a relatively powerless nation like Belgium to stand on the same footing as 
powerful nations like the United States and China. Others, such as Bardo Fassbender, argue that 
the veto is an integral part of a system of checks and balances that helps prevent UN member 
nations from abusing their power. However, Fassbender also observes some problems with the 
veto. These problems include representativeness, arbitrariness and the prevention of discourse. 
He suggests that when only five nations are granted veto power, they may make decisions that 
are not representative of the values and beliefs of UN members or the world at large. He also 
writes that judicial bodies should “avoid arbitrary acts as much as possible” or their commitment 
to the rule of law may be questioned. Finally, he states, the UN was established as a body, which 
was meant to increase discourse among nations in order to prevent unnecessary hostilities. 
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Granting five nations veto power, gives them the power to suppress discourse, which may 
prevent the UN from serving its intended purpose.88  
David Malone, meanwhile, suggests that the veto power may be more than just part of a 
checks and balance system for the UN. Instead, he observes it may help the United Nations 
serves as something more than just “the sum of all its parts” by allowing other nations to veto 
decisions, the UN effectively keeps the United States hegemony in check, by ensuring that there 
is some opposition to the United States aspiration in the international community.89 Ian Hurd 
concurs with this viewpoint, noting that agencies like the UN Security Council gives weak 
nations a leg on which to stand when dealing with stronger powers. When, he notes, Libya 
protested against sanctions levied on it by UN powers, it was able to use the rules and processes 
provided by the UN Security Council to fight against these sanctions.90  
Non-intervention vs. Human Rights Violations 
Many scholars have argued the principle of state sovereignty – the question whether the 
international community should respect Syrian state sovereignty and not intervene in its internal 
affairs or whether an urgent intervention is required since the state itself is the perpetrator. 
Chapter I, Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations on its purposes and principles state:  
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but 
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
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VII, Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations on its action with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.”91  
 This unclear distinction between state sovereignty and human rights caused confusion of 
Charter principles, therefore, Council members urged UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to 
“balance between the fundamental principle of state sovereignty and the need to protect human 
rights” by reviewing the Charter.92 Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina Carlos 
Foradori said that this balance is important so “states could not hide human rights violations 
behind the principle of sovereignty.”93  
 According to the 2005 United Nations World Summit, Resolution 60/1 adopted by the 
General Assembly – the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” indicated in paragraph 138-140 
states:94  
1) “The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement;” 
2) “The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in 
fulfilling this responsibility;” 
3) “The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is 
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manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be 
prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations.”95  
 In fact, many politicians argued that non-intervention in Syria has resulted in numerous 
human rights violations. According to 2015 Human Rights Watch Report on Syria, human rights 
violations consisted of “serious abuses including attacking civilians, using child soldiers, 
kidnapping and torture.” Also, Human Rights Watch estimated “at least 450 major damage sites 
that showed damage consistent with barrel bomb detonations between February 2014 and 
January 2015”, which is enough to kill thousands of people.96 Al markaz al suri lebhoth al-
seyasat; the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) concurs this view in its 2015 report on 
the impact of the Syrian Crisis “Syria Confronting Fragmentation!” in the report it is indicated 
that there have been an extreme impact on the “demographic status in Syria” due to the civil 
conflict; there have been a continuous increase in the numbers of “internally displaced people, 
migrants, refugees, and conflict-related deaths”, this unfortunate escalation of mortalities has 
excavated out most of the “residential population”, resulting in “changing the demographic 
structure significantly.”97 As stated by the Syrian Center for Policy Research, the extensive 
instability and unendurable monetary conditions have constrained a great number of the 
population to resettle inside or outside the nation and to depend entirely on “international 
humanitarian aid”. This loss of security and stability has compromised human rights and dignity 
of the Syrian people. In fact, it is evident from statistics conducted by SCPR, that in 2010 the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Syrian population was 21.80 million, by the end of 2015 the population have dropped to 20.21 
million. “The total population would have reached 25.59 million inhabitants if the conflict had 
not emerged, therefore, counterfactually the real population decreased by 21 per cent.”98 
 According to Amnesty International report of 2015, “Death Everywhere: War Crimes and 
Human Rights Abuses in Aleppo, Syria”, the Syrian government and its forces have “committed 
crimes against human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Aleppo and in Syria as a 
whole.” The government and its forces have violated “international human right and 
humanitarian law affecting civilians on a daily basis.” The city of Aleppo for instance, which 
was known as Syria’s largest city and one of the most ancient cities that are recognized by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World 
Heritage Site continues to be bombarded until this day.99 100 
 On March 15, 2016 – the tenth anniversary of the Human Rights Council, Ban Ki-moon 
opened a panel discussion in New York by addressing the humanitarian catastrophe of the Syrian 
people. He said, “I repeat my call to the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the 
International Criminal Court. In Syria, as elsewhere, peace without justice is not sustainable.” 
Further, he stated that human rights have been under attack around the world. “Civilians caught 
up in conflict are treated as collateral damage, or deliberately targeted. Minorities are under 
assault; refugees are rejected instead of protected.”101 
 Likewise, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi expressed his concerns 
on “the growing vulnerability and fragility of refugees in the host countries.” He portrayed the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Amnesty.org. (2015), 10. Accessed April 1, 2016. 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/embargoed_5_may_aleppo_report_death_everywhere.pdf. 
100 This research has been conducted between January 2016 and May 2016.  
101 Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. "Secretary-General, at Event Marking Tenth Anniversary of Human 
Right Council, Reiterates Call for Syria's Referral to International Criminal Court." United Nations News Center. 
(March 15, 2016). Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm17596.doc.htm.  
!!
24!
!
refugee migration into European countries as a “wake-up call.” Furthermore, he explained that 
the funding provided by world leaders to support the refugees in the Middle-East is not enough 
and therefore the refugees are choosing to flee north searching for a better opportunity and a 
better life.102 As a result, London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region was held on 
February 4, 2016 and was co-hosted by the United Nations and the governments of the United 
Kingdom, Kuwait, Germany and Norway to stress the need of international solidarity. According 
to the United Nations News Centre, this conference exceeded the expected plan and pledged a 
record of $10 billion for immediate humanitarian aid, mustering long-term support, and 
protecting civilians, which were the objectives of this conference.103 Also, Ban Ki-moon said in 
the conference “The promises of long-term funding and loans means that humanitarian and 
development partners will be able to work together to get children back into school, design 
employment programs and begin rebuilding infrastructure.”104 Additionally, Stephen O’Brien, 
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator said in 
London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region, “This vicious cycle of death and 
destruction risks being seen as the new normal Syria. However, death, suffering, wanton 
destruction and disregard for the law should never be seen as normal. Every time we think we 
have reached the nadir of human suffering in this crisis, it continues to sink deeper and deeper 
before our eyes.”105  
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 Also, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein expressed his 
concerns regarding the situation of refugees in his statement to the Human Rights Council’s 31st 
session on March 10, 2016. He said, “due to the lack of viable avenues of entry, many people 
have died trying to reach Europe.” He further explained that the “violation of the fundamental 
principles of solidarity, human dignity, and human rights is picking up momentum.” Therefore, 
he urged the European Union (EU) to “adopt a much more rights-complaint and humane set of 
measures on migration.” He further said, “The Syrian conflict has created a vortex of 
destabilization and violations across the region. There can be no greater or more terrible 
demonstration of the importance of ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law – at all 
times and in all places to prevent such horrors.”106  
 In the same way, on March 30, 2016 Ban Ki-moon met with world leaders at the High-
Level Meeting on Global Responsibility for Syrian Refugees in Geneva. His speech stressed on 
the importance of global solidarity to help the Syrian refugees in all possible ways. He expressed 
his emotional feelings regarding the situation in Syria, which reminded him of his own 
experience in Korea when the country broke up in 1950 and the positive experience he had with 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). He explained that the UN’s commitment helped him and 
the Korean people in the past and now the UN must do everything in its power to help the Syrian 
refugees. He said, “the United Nations was with me and we are going to be with you.” He then 
asked world leaders to “act with solidarity, in the same name of our shared humanity, by 
pledging new additional pathways for the admission of Syrian Refugees. These pathways he 
explained can include resettlement or humanitarian admission, family reunions, as well as labor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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or study opportunities.” UN Secretary-General ended his speech by saying, “We must do much, 
much more.”107  
Resolution 2268 (2016): Cessation of Hostilities in Syria 
 On February 26, 2016 and after nearly five years of war in Syria, the Security Council 
fifteen Member States have finally agreed to unanimously adopt resolution 2268 (2016) on the 
“Cessation of Hostilities in Syria.” This resolution demands that all parties must end the attacks 
and airstrikes in Syria to ease access for United Nations humanitarian aid. According to UN 
Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura this resolution is a “major achievement” after 
prolonged discussions and intense negotiations with all parties.108 However, according to CNN, 
even after the “cessation of hostilities agreement” scattered violence between militants and rebel 
groups was reported around the nation.109  
 According to The Guardian, on March 24, 2016 de Mistura ended the ten days of talks on 
the Syrian civil war by the publication of a statement of common principles, which covers “the 
rejection of terrorism, the rebuilding of the Syrian army, a democratic non-sectarian state, zero 
tolerance or reprisals, the right of return for refugees, rejection of foreign interference in Syria 
and a political transition of power.” According to The Guardian, de Mistura hopes that his 
statement of common principles will diplomatically advance the agenda in Geneva on the second 
week of April 2016.110  
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 Furthermore, according to Grandi, the destiny of masses of Syrian refugees and internally 
displaced people is in the hands of regional and world powers and they must agree on taking an 
action to stop the conflict from continuing in Syria.111 In addition, in an interview with Al 
Jazeera de Mistura said, “partition is not an option for Syria, the unity of a country is 
fundamental, the last thing that Syria need and can afford, is a partition: small states, one 
controlled by a group, sponsored by another, would be unsustainable.”112 
Recommendations: Security Council Reform  
 
Chapter VII, Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations on action with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression states:  
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”113 
It has been evident in the past that the veto power could completely block the Council 
from action even when it is determined that the situation in hand constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security under Article 39, like the situation in Palestine.114 This is also 
true for the situation in Rwanda, when the Council failed to pass a resolution and stop the 
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genocide because of the veto.115 Here, it is important to note that scholars argue that this failure 
of the permanent members in the Council is dangerous due to their selfish political and economic 
interests,116 and therefore the Council requires a logical reform to be able to carry out its duties 
and responsibilities in an effective manner.  
 The argument whether the Security Council needs reform or not have been debated 
among scholars for the past decades.117 From my own observation and recent summer internship 
with the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations in New 
York118 and from my experience with the Security Council and UN General Assembly Fourth 
Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) meetings at the United Nations, I join many 
scholars who argue in favor of an urgent reform to the UN Security Council, which must take 
place immediately. This is due to its continuous failure in maintaining international peace and 
security, which often results in the death of millions, internally displaced people, refugees and 
human right violations.  
 Thus, in order to accommodate the changing world politics, reform in the Security 
Council should take place starting from increasing the number of the Council’s membership.119 
There is no doubt that the Security Council will be more demonstrative, democratic and active by 
implementing this change. This in fact is not a new proposal; in 2005, UN General Assembly 
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draft resolution by India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany (A/59/L.68, paragraph 3) “Decides that 
Article 23, paragraph 1 and 2, of the Charter of the United Nation will read as follows:”120  
“1) The Security Council shall consist of twenty-five Members of the United Nations. 
France, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of  America shall be permanent 
members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other 
Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, 
due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the 
United Nations to the  maintenance of international peace and security and to the other 
purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.” 
“2) The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of 
two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the 
membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five, five of the retiring 
members shall continue for one more year. Non-permanent  members may be eligible for 
immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.”121  
 General Assembly draft resolution A/59/L.68, paragraph 4 “Decides that, in order to 
implement paragraph 3 above, the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall 
be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; 
four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; 
two from Eastern European States.”122 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In addition, scholars such as Sievers and Daws suggest that reform should be done in the 
procedure of the UN Security Council, which involves the working practice of the UN Security 
Council that relates to broadening the Council’s mission, working scope and tasks such as 
fighting international terrorism, including a new understanding on how the Council could use 
force in carrying out its duties.123 Equally, Hurd summarized his proposed reforms into four 
independent, but interrelated steps, where the first step involved changing the membership due to 
inequality, which if not done will cost the Council its legitimacy. The second step involved 
losing legitimacy and therefore, a loss of power. While the third step involved changing the 
structure to increase the legitimacy, the fourth step indicated that increasing the legitimacy would 
increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in discharging its duties.124 Also, many 
scholars have argued for the abolition of veto in the Council. Oludoun argues that this will 
definitely face opposition from the beneficiaries of the privilege. Another argument is that the 
veto could remain with the P-5 members only if there are clear restrictions in the use of the veto 
– which requires a clear explanation by the P-5 for the reasons of the use of the veto. In addition, 
the International Court of Justice must subject such reasons to scrutiny and interpretation.125  
 Nevertheless, the above-proposed reforms can only be achieved by an amendment of the 
Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XVIII Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations on 
amendments states:  
“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the  United 
Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the 
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General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective  constitutional 
processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the 
permanent members of the Security Council.”126  
 This means that the veto power still applies here and can be used by any of the five 
permanent members to override the attempt for any reform or amendment of the Charter of the 
United Nations.127 For this reason, I suggest that the UN Security Council implement a majority 
voting system among the P-5 Member States, which may not require the amendment of the 
Charter of the United Nations and could be applied immediately. This voting system would only 
allow the veto to pass on a certain resolution if three out of the five permanent members vetoes 
the resolution. For instance, by implementing this policy the Russian veto alone or the Russian 
and Chinese veto combined on resolutions regarding Syria would not pass unless a third P-5 
Member State vetoes the resolution as well (see illustration below). This re-examination of the 
veto politics in the Council, will allow it to be more flexible democratically and more effective in 
maintaining international peace and security. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations.” UN. (June 1945). Accessed January 30, 2016. 
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html 
127 Oludoun, Temitope. "Peace and Security as a Catalyst for the Reform of the UN Security Council." Review of 
International Law and Politics no. 39 (2014): 63, 90. HeinOnline, EBSCOhost. Accessed February 15, 2016. 
!!
32!
!
 
 
 
 
 
!!
33!
!
 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that even non-permanent members of the Security Council 
views the Council as ineffective towards its policies on the Syrian situation and that it needs 
reform, for instance, in 2013 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejected a “highly coveted”128 seat on 
the Council. According to Aljazeera the Saudi Foreign Ministry said, “Work mechanisms and 
double – standards in the Security Council prevent it from carrying out its duties and assuming 
its responsibilities in keeping world peace. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has no other option but to 
turn down the Security Council membership until it is reformed and given the means to 
accomplish its duties and assume its responsibilities in preserving the world’s peace and 
security.”129  
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Another suggestion for reform is a crisis management plan. A crisis is a major occurrence 
with a potentially negative outcome affecting an institution.130 “It threatens high-priority goals of 
the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision 
is transformed, and surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.”131 A 
crisis could occur at any time in any situation and it could take away the focus of management, 
therefore, having a good crisis management plan is crucial for any institution. This plan must 
include a crisis management team that is well trained and prepared to prevent a crisis from 
occurring. In the case of the Security Council, it is evident that each crisis is different with its 
own dynamics and traps. However, since the Council’s main goal is to maintain international 
peace and security, I suggest that the Council implement a crisis management plan that is tailored 
towards that goal.  
The plan must be articulated in a clear manner, indicating the refusal of the application of 
the veto power under any circumstances, and thus permitting the UN Security Council to take 
immediate necessary actions to restore international peace and security, particularly in cases – 
where innocent civilian lives are in jeopardy because of their own governments. Here, it is 
important to note that this crisis management plan must not require any reform or amendment of 
the Charter of the United Nations and must include three stages: pre-crisis, crisis response and 
post-crisis to ensure its effectiveness and successfulness.132 These three stages are suggested by 
multiple crisis communication scholars, and applied on a business and or institutional spectrum. 
However, I believe that they will be successful if applied in a diplomatic framework as well.  
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For instance, in the case of the Syrian situation, the Council should take immediate action 
to intervene and stop the conflict in the region since the government is the perpetrator itself – this 
intervention should include ceasefire, military sanctions, and global arms embargo in the region. 
The intervention by the Council should not be restricted by the veto power and should not be led 
by any of the P-5 members, but by the distinct power of the Security Council as a UN body. 
Following intervention the Council should continue negotiations towards a transitional 
government this should include representatives from the Syrian people or opposition. After the 
creation of a transitional government, several steps should be taken. First, the overall 
construction of the military must be maintained in order to guarantee the safety of all citizens.133 
 Dr. Radwan Ziadeh argues that the regime’s current four intelligence branches: Syrian 
Military Intelligence, Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Political Security Directorate under the 
Ministry of Interior and General Intelligence Directorate134 should be merged into two branches 
and their efforts should be directed toward stabilizing Syria and reforming the domestic police 
force in the role of protecting the people. In addition, all political prisoners must be released. 
Nevertheless, a political reform in Syria should begin with establishing a post-conflict new 
democratic constitution – one that guarantees the fundamental rights of all citizens and 
underlines a strict separation between legislative, judicial and executive bodies. The constitution 
must also include fundamental reforms to the justice system.135 By the implementation of this 
crisis management plan and following the three stages (see illustration below), there is no doubt 
that the Council will be able to maintain future crises more cost-effectively, minimize the 
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damages and strengthen the international community’s confidence in its role.  
 
 
 
Resolution 377 A (V): Uniting for Peace 
 In 1950, a limitation on the veto power in the Security Council was implemented136 
specifically after the Soviet Union vetoed all decisions by the Security Council on any methods 
that were proposed to protect the Republic of Korea from the violence launched against it by 
North Korea.137  This limitation of the veto power was referred to as General Assembly 
Resolution 377 A (V) of 1950 “Uniting for Peace.” Section A (1) of the resolution states:  
“Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the  maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making  appropriate recommendations to Members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the 
use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency 
special session within  twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special 
session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the voter of any seven 
members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.”138  
 Thus, “Uniting for Peace” provides the General Assembly a powerful mechanism to 
override any veto by the P-5 members and allow it to intervene in situations that threaten world 
peace and security in the case of a deadlocked Security Council.139 This resolution can be 
invoked by two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, and has been used on ten occasions 
since its implementation140 (see table below).141 In each occasion the General Assembly was able 
to intervene and contain the crisis. However, in the case of Syria the Security Council did not 
call for an emergency special session since the conflict started in 2011. Therefore, it is safe to 
argue that this action by the Security Council undermines its legitimacy as the most powerful UN 
body, and its ability to maintain international peace and security.  
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UN General Assembly Ten Emergency Special Sessions (ESS)142 
Session Date Convened By Description 
1st session  1-10 November 1956 Security Council  On the 1956 Israel-Egypt war and 
Suez Canal crisis 
2nd session  4-10 November 1956 Security Council On the Hungarian Revolution 
3rd session  8-21 August 1958  Security Council On the Lebanese Crisis 
4th session  17-19 September 1960 Security Council On the question of Congo Crisis 
5th session  17-18 June 1967 Security Council On the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
6th session  10-14 January 1980 Security Council On the situation in Afghanistan 
7th session  22-29 July 1980; 20-28 
April 1982; 25-26 June 
1982; 16-19 August 
1982 and 24 September 
1982 
Senegal  On the question of Palestine 
8th session  13-14 September 1981 Zimbabwe On the question of Namibia 
9th session  29 January – 5 February 
1982  
Security Council On the situation of the occupied 
Arab territories 
10th session  24-25 April 1997 – 23 
January 2009 
Qatar On the illegal Israeli actions in the 
occupied Arab territories  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Conclusion 
The United Nations, seen partially as a humanitarian organization and guided by those 
principles, must consider options based on the premise that the world humanitarian community is 
“deeply skeptical of military interventions presented as for protecting civilians...” and their 
inevitable consequence: civilian casualties.143 While the UN “Responsibility to Protect” dictates 
clearly and states its role in protecting innocent civilians, the UN is reluctant to support this 
principle in Syria on the basis of “non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.” 144  
 In the case of Syria, it is evident that the P-5 members would prioritize political and 
strategic interests above respect of human lives and dignity.145 There are many state and non-
state actors in regard to the situation in Syria. However, Russia is the most obvious veto obstacle 
in the Security Council; Putin has clearly aligned his regime with that of al-Assad although it has 
committed violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity such as, “torture, rape and abuse 
in detention centers, extra judicial killings, mass arrests, forced disappearances, displacement, 
barrel bomb attacks and inhumane treatment” against its own population; this also includes 
denying access to humanitarian aid and hospitals for those who are injured.146 147 148 “Repeated 
vetoes of draft resolutions and even the mere threat of a veto have stalled negotiations and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rendered the Security Council largely passive in the face of mass atrocity.”149 Therefore, it is of 
utmost importance for the UN Security Council to “bring a case to the ICC court against the 
perpetrators of these crimes.”150 This will stop the conflict in Syria and prevent similar crimes 
from occurring in the future.   
 This veto power of the permanent members causes the most problems in terms of 
international conflicts and peacekeeping. This is evident, in multiple occasions in the past such 
as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the genocide in Rwanda. Today, the real question would 
be; is the United Nations Security Council morally responsible to re-examine the veto politics in 
the Council to protect its power from being violated in the future? And would this not restrict the 
power of the Security Council when there is a violation of international law, international 
humanitarian law, and human rights law? 
 The UN Security Council reform measures mentioned above are common sense policies 
that could prevent the next Syria from occurring. The reform recommendations address the 
problem of what justifies international intervention to ensure international peace and security, as 
well as the re-examination of the Council’s veto politics to comply with the Charter of the United 
Nations. The reforms also admit the clear lack of organizational decision-making relative to this 
activity endemic within the Council. So far, regarding Syria most of the proposals are “inherently 
politically unrealistic” and, along with UN “decision-making deficits…fail to address the subject 
of implementation altogether.”151 While some criticize the undemocratic nature of the Council, 
others think that changing the structure to make it easier for the Council to act may place more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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power in undemocratic hands. If there is no road-map to action, there can be no action at all—
which is where the situation regarding Syria now stands.152 Perhaps the best option for nations, 
which are frustrated with Russia’s tendency to veto humanitarian intervention, is to work on 
improving relations between Russia and the West so that it is easier for the international 
community to come to a consensus when atrocities occur. 
 Hence, it is not difficult to see why the United Nations Security Council is seen as 
ineffective and in need of reform; it does not always end crises quickly. In the case of Syria, it 
took nearly five years of civil war for the UN Security Council to agree on the cessation of 
hostilities – a measure that might put an end to the nation’s civil war. This lack of action to stop 
the conflict in Syria has resulted in the largest refugee crisis globally, displacing millions of 
people outside their country. One would hope that future events such as, The World 
Humanitarian Summit that will be held in Istanbul on May 23-24, 2016153 and the United 
Nations General Assembly High Level Summit that will be held in New York on September 19, 
2016154 on reducing human suffering and large movements of refugees and migrants will bring 
the international community together. Lastly, it is important to note that in almost all of the 
United Nations briefings on Syria UN Secretary General has repeatedly said, “The Syrian 
conflict has been the scene of the use of chemical weapons, siege and starvation as a tool of war, 
unlawful detention, torture, and the indiscriminate and criminal shelling and aerial bombardment 
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of civilians. Those responsible for these crimes must be held to account.”155 This is the only 
possible way to re-stabilize Syria for the next generations.  
Additional Questions  
 
• Is the United Nations Security Council morally responsible to re-examine the veto 
politics in the Council to protect its power from being violated in the future? And would 
this not restrict the power of the Security Council when there is a violation of 
international law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law? 
• What relationship could the West build with the Russian Federation to allow greater 
flexibility and maintain a diplomatic stance in the Security Council? 
• What is preventing the Security Council from using Resolution 377 A “Uniting for 
Peace” and calling for an emergency special session on Syria? 
• How could the international community work together to re-stabilize Syria after the 
prolonged civil war?  
• Would President Bashar al-Asaad’s resignation and a transitional government stabilize 
Syria or strengthen the extremist militant groups?  
• What measures should the Security Council take in order to ensure a stable transitional 
government in Syria? 
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 This paper examines the means of which the Syrian refugee crisis captured the world’s 
attention in 2015. Also, it examines the issues of migration and integration by analyzing the 
obstacles and living conditions faced by refugees in the Gulf, Europe and North America. It 
discusses the hostility refugees often receive in some countries and the long-term effects they 
develop as a result. In addition, it critically analyzes international refugee law standards and the 
division of responsibilities among countries. Furthermore, it discusses the challenges confronted 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in assisting Syrian refugees. Finally, the 
paper suggests some measures that if undertaken by the international community will help the 
Syrian people to re-build their lives in a foreign country.  
Introduction 
 The Syrian refugee crisis has been one of the major crises we have encountered in our 
21st century. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Syrian refugee crisis is the biggest in a generation.1 In addition the European Commission 
described the crisis as, “the world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War II.”2 However, 
despite human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity that continue to occur 
in Syria since 2011, only few people are aware of the severity of the situation. In 2015, the 
Syrian refugee crisis captured the world’s attention when three-year-old Aylan Kurdi’s image 
became viral on the Internet.3 The heartbreaking image of the child’s body that was found by the 
Turkish coastline was one of the primary means that brought the international community 
together.4 Aylan Kurdi is only one of thousands of Syrians who have lost their lives crossing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 "UNHCR Overview: 2015 Syria Response Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan." UNHCR 
Syria Regional Refugee Response. (December 2014). Accessed February 15, 2016. 
https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees 
2 European Commission. "Syria Crisis." (March 2016), 1-3. Accessed April 10, 2016. 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf 
3Gilmartin, Thomas. "The Refugee Crisis." Multilingual 27, no. 2 (March, 2016), 38-43. Accessed April 10, 2016.  
         4 Ibid. 
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Mediterranean Sea to flee the civil war in their country and reach Europe. In addition, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was also a key player in showing the international 
community the severity of the situation. While countries close to Syria such as Lebanon, Turkey 
and Jordan were well aware of the growing issue of what to do with the Syrian population 
entering into their borders, the rest of the world remained largely unaware, primarily due to lack 
of media attention and or lack of media coverage of countries within the Middle East being 
presented from a humanitarian perspective.5 6 As UNHCR worked to make the situation known 
to other countries, and as more and more Syrian refugees started to continue to spill over the 
borders into countries further and further afield, it became clear that there was a growing cause 
for concern. UNHCR, in conjunction with media outlets and charitable organizations, worked to 
personalize the Syrian refugees to the rest of the world, drawing attention to the growing plight 
of these individuals and working to shed light on the situation while at the same time working to 
increase support for those who would not otherwise be receiving aid and assistance.7 8 9 10 
Although the potency of this message has dissipated somewhat in light of the passage of time, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Denton, Bryan. "The middle-class Syrian refugee." Foreign Policy no. 203 (2013), 24. General OneFile, 
EBSCOhost. Accessed April 1, 2016.  
6 "Syrian Refugees Seeking Help." The Lancet (London, England) 385, no. 9964: 202 (January 2015). MEDLINE, 
EBSCOhost. Accessed March 5, 2016.  
7 Denton, Bryan. "The middle-class Syrian refugee." Foreign Policy no. 203 (2013), 24. General OneFile, 
EBSCOhost. Accessed April 1, 2016.  
8 Pottie, Kevin,M.D.M.ClSc, Christina Greenaway M.D.M.Sc, Ghayda Hassan PhD., Charles Hui M.D., and 
Laurence J. Kirmayer M.D. "Caring for a Newly Arrived Syrian Refugee Family." Canadian Medical 
Association.Journal. (2016). 188 (3), 207-211. Accessed March 5, 2016.    
9 Saab, Basem. “Reflections on the plight of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.” The British Journal of General Practice: 
The British Journal of General Practice: The Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners 64, no. 619. 
(February, 2014), 94. MEDLINE, EBSCOhost. Accessed April 10, 2016. 
10 "Syrian Refugees Seeking Help." The Lancet (London, England) 385, no. 9964: 202 (January 2015). MEDLINE, 
EBSCOhost. Accessed March 5, 2016.!
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the events that sparked such a crisis stem from much farther back, to 2011, and still continue to 
this day.11  
The Conflict12 
  During the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Syrian people had enough of the authoritarian 
regime, violence and societal discrimination against women and minorities.13 All of these issues 
led to pro-democracy demonstrations to protest the state of affairs within their nation. Anti-
government slogans and graffiti in particular served as the starting point for events that soon 
spiraled quickly out of control, similar again to actions that have been taken in many places 
around the world; unlike events that transpire in many places, however, those who were tasked 
with responding to the protesters instead opened fire on them.14 The conflict continued to 
escalate, from peaceable protests to armed protests, to protesters and security forces firing upon 
one another, descending into civil war.15 As with all civil wars, civilians who were not a part of 
the war were caught in the middle, resulting in the deaths of thousands. As of June 2013, the 
United Nations reported that over 90,000 people had been killed; as of August 2015, the United 
Nations indicated that the death toll had exceeded more than 250,000.16 Following the escalation 
of the internal conflict within Syria’s borders, Syrian residents who did not wish to take part in 
the conflict started leaving the country; as of the beginning of March 2015, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 4.3 million people are refugees in neighboring 
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countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq and more than 7.6 million people are 
internally displaced in Syria.17 When comparing these numbers to the numbers taken in 2014, 
with 7.6 million internally displaced and an additional 4.3 million having left the country, it is 
clear that the problem continues to grow as more and more of those who have been displaced 
within their own countries continue their exodus from their home country.18 
International Refugee Law 
 International refugee law or the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was 
created to protect European refugees after World War II. The 1967 Protocol was added as a 
provision to ensure the assistance of global refugees after 1951.19 Its main responsibility is to 
ensure basic principles of human rights for the treatment of refugees against any kind of 
discrimination, Chapter I, Article 3 on non-discrimination of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees states, “The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this 
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”20 
Chapter I, Article 4 on religion also states, “The Contracting States shall accord to refugees 
within their territories treatment at least as favorable as that accorded to their national with 
respect to freedom to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of 
their children.”21 Chapter IV, Article 22 (1) on public education states, “The Contracting States 
shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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education.”22 Chapter V, Article 26 on freedom of movement states, “The Contracting States 
shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to 
move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the 
same circumstances.”23 In addition, International refugee law dictates under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 (1) that, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution.”24 In order to ensure that such protections are granted 
to individuals throughout the world, UNHCR works closely in conjunction with various 
governments across six continents in order to ensure that refugees are granted asylum and are 
allowed to remain in the country that granted them asylum “until conditions were conducive for 
the refugees to return to their homes in safety and with dignity.”25 This is done by the 
implementation of non-refoulement and durable solutions to re-stabilize the refugees in foreign 
countries.26 As a result of actions taken by this organization, many countries now allow refugees 
to simply settle permanently within their borders following the granting of asylum, particularly 
in instances in which it is no longer safe for that individual to return to their home country, 
regardless of the state of affairs within the country.  
 Although the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 
is supposed to provide “dignity, worth, and freedom, in equality, to those who are displaced”27, it 
is limited in its language and does not indicate exactly how the shared amount of responsibilities 
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for protection measures are divided and or shared between states.28 For instance, international 
refugee law does not dictate that a permanent home is a requirement to protect refugees.29 This 
lack of a legal framework in international refugee law is problematic because it victimizes those 
who are displaced and leads to a bigger problem that is evident now among the Member States of 
the European Union, instead of working to reduce the long-term effects that refugees often 
develop as a result of their displacement and or refugee status. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to clarify strategies and protection measures in international refugee law to develop 
partnership, protection capacity, durable solutions and full ownership of responsibility towards 
refugee and asylum laws.30  
Syrian Guests in the Gulf  
 Since the conflict started in Syria, Western media criticized the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman for not 
offering to host refugees. However, this criticism has often come with no concrete evidence on 
whether or not these Gulf States hosted refugees. When looking at Saudi Arabia’s UNHCR 
page,31 for instance it is evident that western media are “conveniently omitting” some of the data 
and publicizing misleading information.32 A 2015 study conducted by Francoise De Bel-Air for 
the European University Institute and the Gulf Research Centre has indicated that because the 
Gulf countries are not signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
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Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, the Syrian people who have entered the Gulf States are not 
considered or referred to as refugees and therefore, they are not registered as such with 
UNHCR.33 The Gulf States refer to those fleeing a civil war in their countries as “guests” or 
“brothers and sisters in distress.”34 According to many Arabic publications, the GCC use a 
different political language when referring to Syrians to preserve their dignity and identity.35 
This is because in the Arab world, guests and people in distress are usually honored and praised 
culturally and religiously. In other words, as Almonitor describes it “treating refugees as guests 
carries an element of prestige for the host country.”36 Arab News for instance, explained that 
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia said, “The 
Kingdom does not deal with Syrian expats like refugees. They are living in a normal 
environment not in special camps.”37  
 Furthermore, at the time of his statement, Nabil Othman, UNHCR regional representative 
to the Gulf region said, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received 500,000 Syrians.38 More recently, 
according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the nation has received 2.5 million Syrians since 
the conflict started in Syria.39 Here, it is important to note that such claims by government 
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officials may be skeptical sometimes. However, in 2012, a royal decree was issued to allow 
Syrian children to study for free in local schools and universities and to provide all Syrians free 
medical care from local hospitals.40 Saudi government statistics indicates that the public school 
system has accepted more than 100,000 Syrian students nationwide and universities are 
instructed to incorporate about 3,000 Syrian students. For instance, King Abdulaziz University in 
the city of Jeddah has created its separate online student portal to prioritize Syrian applicants and 
support all Syrian residents to apply for university.41 In addition, Syrians are allowed to work in 
the private sector like any other resident and are free to move around the country as they wish.42 
Similarly, the Ministry of Labor of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has created its own program 
‘Ajeer’ or ‘employee’ in English. This program and its online portal were designed to facilitate 
and document foreign employees in the Kingdom, it includes three main parts: Ajeer for 
Business Services which aims to legalize foreign employees, Ajeer for Dependent Services 
which aims to provide jobs in the education sector to those accompanying the foreign employees, 
and Ajeer for Guest Services which aims to provide temporary work visas for Yemeni and 
Syrian nationals in the country.43  
 According to albawaba news, the Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
allowed Syrian nationals who carry a valid visit, Hajj, or Umrah visa to remain in the country 
without iqamas; residency permits that allows a non-citizen to stay in a foreign country. 
However, the Ministry urged those who choose to stay in the country to apply to correct their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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status. According to Former Minister of Justice Mohammed Al-Issa, “the ministry would allow 
Syrians holding these visas to live in the country legally.”44 Likewise, the Ministry of Interior 
has issued a statement to exempt Syrian guests who violate the residency or labor guidelines 
from deportation. Security spokesman of the Ministry of Interior Major General Mansour Al-
Turki said, “the situation in Syria does not allow for the deportation of Syrians whom found in 
violation of regulations and guidelines of the Kingdom, the Ministry is willing to give those 
violators the opportunity to correct their status and live in the country if they wish.”45  
 The Kingdom has also supported millions of Syrians in neighboring countries such as 
Jordan, Lebanon, and others. Humanitarian assistance such as, food, medical, academic and 
residential supplies have been provided in coordination with the host governments and with 
international humanitarian organizations. Also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the 
Kingdom was able to establish Saudi specialized clinics for the Syrian refugees at Zaatari camp 
in Jordan and sponsored a large number of Syrian families living in Lebanon and Syria through 
paying their rent, living costs and education for their children.46 According to the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), all humanitarian-funding initiatives from 
the Saudi government for Syria falls under the Saudi National Campaign for Supporting 
Syrians.47 48 49  UNOCHA indicate that this campaign “accumulated over $32 million in just a 
few days.”50  
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 In addition, The National states that the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to the United 
States said, the United Arab Emirates has received about 100,000 Syrians since the conflict 
started in 2011. The nation’s statistics indicate that by 2015 there is a total of quarter a million 
Syrians who live in the country.51 According to the Financial Times, the United Arab Emirates 
has donated $10.7 million to UNHCR, besides the $17.1 million that was added from the private 
sector. Statistics indicate that since the start of the conflict in 2011, the United Arab Emirates 
provided $581.5 million for humanitarian aid; this includes support to hospitals in refugee camps 
in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey.52  
 Similar to Saudi Arabia, the General Directorate for Residency Affairs of the Ministry of 
Interior of Kuwait stated that the government will grant all Syrian nationals residency extensions 
in the country and that they will not be deported if they could not renew their expired passports.53 
Qatar another Gulf country has donated $26.6 million towards humanitarian aid for Syria, in 
addition to the $20.9 million that was donated by the private sector.54 The table presented below 
includes statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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on the Third International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria that was hosted in 
Kuwait on March 31, 2015. The table explains the pledges made by the GCC.55 
Member State Pledge 
Kuwait56  US$500 million from both the government and the civil sectors 
Saudi Arabia  US$60 million in addition to the US$600 million contribution since 
2011 
United Arab Emirates  US$100 million in addition to the US$365 million contribution 
since 2012 
Qatar  Did not pledge at conference but noted that Qatar has contributed 
to date more than US$2 billion towards humanitarian assistance to 
Syria and promised a new contribution of US$160 million by 
Qatari NGOs this year 
Oman  US$17 million 
 
 Here, it is important to note that although the Gulf States are not signatories to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, Syrians who are 
considered guests in the Gulf receive most of the rights granted under the Convention such as the 
right to education, work, health care, free movement and residence. However, unlike Syrians 
who would be granted asylum in Europe and North America, the Gulf States does not guarantee 
this privilege. This was unacceptable 60 years ago when the Convention was found and still 
unacceptable today. This is largely because the Gulf States believe that people should have the 
right to return to homes they fled or were forced out from.57 Another argument is that foreign 
workers or expatriates who work and reside in the Gulf already outnumber local citizens and 
therefore the Gulf States are concerned “that they could be flooded demographically, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economically and politically.”58 In addition, the difficulty in obtaining citizenship or in this case 
refugee status in the GCC is also related to the benefits attached to the citizenship and the 
importance to not dilute these benefits by attempting to naturalize the foreign workers and or 
residence who as mentioned before outnumber local citizens.59 Also, unlike Europe and North 
America, the Gulf States have a different philosophy and or interpretation in determining who 
acquires citizenship, this is often not limited to the commitments to living and working in a 
country, but it has to do with valuing “social significance that can be placed on family descent 
and lineage, which affect the status of different tiers of citizens as well as helping to determine 
who is, a citizen.”60 These restrictions on citizenship and or asylum status in the Gulf, poses 
limitations on civil and political rights of foreigners and or guests living in the region, which is 
often problematic to some extent. Many critics argue that those displaced by war would not have 
homes to go back to in their countries and therefore they are in need of a new citizenship that 
guarantees them all the rights to start a new life as a citizen in a new country.61  
 Nevertheless, what originally served, for Syrian refugees as transitory and irregular 
migration, is now becoming forced migration, as the countries closest to the borders of Syria: 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey are reaching and, in some cases, have reached, their maximum 
capacity for the number of individuals they are able to take in.62 63 In spite of this, many of those 
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who are allowed to stay are not able to obtain formal housing within those countries, being 
forced to live in tent cities made up of whatever materials are made available to them.64 As these 
nations are forced to turn others away, the migration path of Syrian refugees away from their 
homes become even longer, as they are forced to continue further away from home.  
 According to Al-monitor, a Bahraini analyst said, geographically “Syrians find it easier to 
flee to Europe rather than the Gulf because the Gulf States do not share land borders with Syria 
unlike Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. And different from Europe, Gulf States are not accessible 
via the Mediterranean.”65 With this in mind, it is safe to conclude that the information given by 
western media in regard to the Gulf reaction towards the Syrian crisis is misleading and is based 
on no concrete evidence.  
Syrian Refugees in Europe 
 Unlike Jordan, Lebanon and the GCC countries, European States are signatories to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol and therefore have 
legal obligations toward refugees66 however; they often fail to uphold these obligations. While 
the majority of the responses toward the Syrian refugees has been positive, concerned only with 
assisting those who have found themselves lost, without homes, without their country, without 
many of their family members, and without the life that they had built for themselves, there is a 
darker side to the situation. Europe’s reaction towards the refugee crisis remains “largely 
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unsympathetic, sometimes violent and unwilling to accept large numbers of refugees,”67 in 
particular that of Hungary, Macedonia, Albania and Serbia the negative reaction is evident in the 
use of military force to stop the refugees from crossing borders to non-Mediterranean Europe.68 
For instance, the unfortunate incident of the Hungarian journalist Petra László who was filmed 
kicking and tripping Syrian children who were running their way through the Hungarian border69 
is only one example of many incidents that the Syrian refugees experience in Europe because of 
the same “xenophobia and racism” that the European themselves encountered after World War 
II.70 Since the refugee flow to Europe, many European leaders stated that Europe has no space to 
host this large amount of refugees, some claiming that by finding the space and doing so 
Europe’s ideological identity, which is Christian or Secular will be threatened by Muslim 
refugees.71 In addition, the statement by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban that 
opening borders for Syrian refugees means “importing terrorism, criminalism anti-semitism and 
homophobia”72 has created more fear in the international community. Additionally, many have 
criticized the European Union – Turkey refugee deal that encourages exchanging Syrian refugees 
from Greek to Turkey and Syrian asylum seekers from Turkey to Europe, arguing that this deal 
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violates the grounds of the 1951 Refugee Convention and basic rights of human beings – which 
is treatment with dignity.73  
 On the other hand, Syrian refugees in efforts to assist the countries that have taken them 
in, work to report individuals that they see within their midst who have known ties to terrorist 
organizations, including the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Da’esh, Jabhat al- 
Nusra or the Nusra Front, and other Al-Qaeda affiliates.74 75 76 77 Such considerations on the part 
of those refugees who are truly attempting to work with the system has, however, created public 
backlash and a concern on the part of other countries as to whether or not they should even 
consider taking in refugees at all, for fear of opening themselves up to a potential terrorist attack 
or the setup of a terrorist cell on their soil.78 79 80 81 This fear even increased more after the Paris 
attacks in 2015 that was said, inspired by some extremists who arrived in Europe with the 
refugees.82 The result of such backlash has created a situation that becomes more difficult for 
genuine refugees, as they must work to fight against ever increasingly stringent requirements in 
hopes of being granted asylum, the only way through federal channels that they will be able to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not only stay in the country, but to receive the assistance that they need in order to get back onto 
their feet.  
 Furthermore, with the non-ending war in Syria and with the increasing number of 
refugees since 2015, even the welcoming European countries have introduced measures on 
border restrictions and allowed number of refugees to enter their countries due to “housing, 
school, job shortage”83 and fear of terrorist attacks. However, despite the policy changes since 
2015, Germany’s reaction towards the refugees is an example of how Europe should be treating 
the refugees in their crisis.84 Germany opened its borders for about 1.1 million refugees; more 
refugees than any other country in the European Union have taken in. Local residents welcomed 
refugees with “voluntary language classes, house sharing and other initiatives”85 to help the 
Syrian refugees feel accepted. Also, Sweden is another example of a welcoming European 
country; Sweden opened its borders to 160,000 refugees in 2015 “more per capita than any other 
European country.”86 As stated, the reaction towards the refugee crisis has been different from 
one country to the other in the European Union resulting in disunion and instability in some 
cases.  
 In summary, it is evident that the European Union has a lot to overcome including 
“geography and proximity to instability” in order to be able to work in solidarity to consider the 
bigger picture of this refugee crisis. This could transpire by introducing long-term protection 
measures to those affected by the war including by “sharing refugees equitably by financial 
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support or hosting population.”87 There is no doubt that how Europe responds to this crisis today 
in the 21st century will change the context of the European history for the generations of the next 
century.88 
Syrian Refugees in North America  
 Similar to Europe, the United States and Canada are signatories to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol and therefore have legal obligations 
toward refugees.89 Unlike the United States however, Canada has opened its borders for about 
26,506 Syrian refugees according to government statistics.90 The hash tag #WelcomeRefugees 
that was created by the government provided a safe haven for refugees to accept Canada as their 
final destination.91 The Canadian plan of welcoming refugees consisted of five phases: phase one 
involved working with UNHCR to identify Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, phase two 
involved visa processing for refugees, phase three involved organizing private aircrafts to bring 
the refugees to Canada, phase four involved welcoming refugees in Canada by verifying their 
identity and providing treatment for the ill, phase five involved transporting refugees to 
communities across the nation to settle, integrate and build a new life for themselves and their 
family. In addition, all Syrian refugees are provided with immediate necessary services and long-
term settlement support to guarantee their prosperous integration into Canadian society.92  
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 In the United States, only 1,500 Syrian refugees have been admitted since 2011, and the 
government promised to admit 10,000 more refugees in 2016.93 However, since the recent 
attacks in France and San Bernardino, California news outlets and reports have covered the 
debate among politicians in the nation’s capital on whether the United States should allow Syrian 
refugees to enter the country or not. With 31 states opposing to take in refugees, the situation 
becomes more challenging.94 Texas Governor Greg Abbott for instance has been one of the first 
politicians to oppose Obama’s decision to allow in 10,000 more refugees in 2016, he has said 
numerous times that the State of Texas will not participate in accepting the Syrian refugees. In 
approval of Abbott’s decision, the State of Texas witnessed multiple protests of armed 
individuals demonstrating against accepting the refugees by carrying signs stating, “Refugees are 
Not Welcome in Texas.”95 In addition, outrageous comments such as “lock your doors, Muslims 
are coming”96 and the idea of a “religious test”97 to pick and choose refugees who may be 
admitted to the United States by presidential candidates such as, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz 
only proves the view of the undemocratic racist Americans in America as many have argued.98 99 
In fact, President Obama said, “hysteria or an exaggeration of risks” in this matter is not good 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Dinan, Stephen. "Obama’s Vow to Take in 10,000 Syrian Refugees under Fire after Paris Attack." Washington 
Times. (November 2015). Accessed April 10, 2016.   http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/14/obama-
vow-take-10000-syrian-refugees-under-fire-af/?page=all.  
94 Fantz, Ashley, and Ben Brumfield. "Syrian Refugees Not Welcome in 31 U.S. States." CNN. (November 2015). 
Accessed April 30, 2016.  http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks-syrian-refugees-backlash/.  
95 Benning, Tom. "Gov. Greg Abbott: Texas Will Not Accept Any Syrian Refugees." Trail Blazers Blog. (November 
2015). Accessed April 10, 2016.  http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/11/gov-greg-abbott-texas-will-not-
accept-any-syrian-refugees.html/.  
96 Engel, Pamela. "Trump on Syrian Refugees: 'Lock Your Doors, Folks'" Business Insider. (April 2016). Accessed 
April 30, 2016.  http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-syrian-refugees-isis-2016-4.  
97 Schleifer, Theodore. "Ted Cruz: Muslim Refugees from Syria Should Go to Other Islamic Countries." CNN. 
(November 2015). Accessed April 30, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/17/politics/ted-cruz-refugees-syria/. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Reyes, Raul. "How GOP 'Outrage' Over Refugees Helps ISIS". CNN. (November 2015). Accessed February 5, 
2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/opinions/reyes-syria-refugees/. 
!!
75!
!
because we often do not make good decisions like that.100 Also, similar to many scholars, Elena 
Loizidou argues that this “rapid rise of fear of the Other” is dangerous because it creates hatred, 
racism and divisions.101 Gallya Lahav also argues that the international community must not 
forget that the massive flows of Syrians are fleeing ISIS and an oppressive regime. Therefore, 
the international community should “uphold and adjust legal standards” to assist those victims 
and help them build their lives again.102  
United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR) 
 The question of whether or not “enough” is being done to help the Syrian refugees is a 
tricky one, one that often varies depending on the perceptions of those looking at the situation. In 
the case of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, lack of funding is one of the 
largest problems, but it is not the only problem faced in an effort to assist and care for the Syrian 
refugees. Current United Nations statistics estimate that approximately $3.2 billion dollars is 
needed at this time to assist the 13.5 million people, including approximately six million 
children, who have been affected by the crisis in Syria.103 Approximately 70% of those within 
Syria are without access to sanitary drinking water, one out of every three people is not getting 
enough sustenances to meet their basic food needs, over two million children are not able to 
attend school at this time, and four out of every five individuals are living in conditions of 
poverty.104 To further compound the matter, only those who are outside Syria’s borders are able 
to receive assistance at this time, as both sides of the civil war in Syria have unequivocally stated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that no relief access will be granted to UNHCR, the idea being that the other side could likewise 
gain assistance from the relief efforts, and neither party wishes the other side to gain access to 
outside support. As a result, the situation becomes even more complex, as it is the mandate of the 
UNHCR to provide assistance to those in need. Still further concerns are associated with enough 
housing and available supplies for those who need them, a situation further complicated by the 
lack of available funding.105 106 Furthermore, there is a lack of available medical supplies and 
locations for treatment for those in need, and facilities both in terms of human capital and 
resources, to ensure that such individuals have access to appropriate schooling.107 108 All of the 
above limitations indicate the lack of support UNHCR is receiving from the international 
community.  
Syria’s Future 
 As proven by many reports and scholars over the last five years, the crimes committed in 
Syria are implemented within the Assad regime. This regime is the main reason and the main 
responsible actor in the refugee crisis, despite ISIS or Da’esh’s publicized grave killings, the 
Assad regime have committed violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity such as, 
“torture, rape and abuse in detention centers, extra judicial killings, mass arrests, forced 
disappearances, displacement, barrel bomb attacks and inhumane treatment” against its own 
population; this also includes denying access to humanitarian aid and hospitals for those who are 
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injured.109 110 111 Thus, the re-stabilization of Syria and its people’s future is dependent on ending 
the Assad regime. However, with this current state of affairs, the question becomes, how can this 
situation be improved? What actions can be taken that will assist the refugees, helping them 
improve their current situation and end the stagnation of the past few years? The answer is not a 
simple one. The problem is several folds. 
 First, the story has lost its momentum in the United States, particularly in light of the 
political events going on at this time. In election year, the people, and the news media, are 
concerned only with what is going, on within their own borders. The problem is one of self-
absorption. The second issue is one of the abstract versus the targeted. There are discussion 
boards across the internet, on British and American forums alike that are full of posts from 
individuals who state that they would be more than willing to allow refugees to stay in a spare 
room in their house or even would be willing to allow a family of Syrian refugees to use one of 
their extra houses, either an income property or a vacation home, and requesting that if anyone 
has any information as to how to provide those services, to let them know. As of last year, some 
Syrian refugees started finding these message boards and replying to the threads. Refugees tell 
their name, ages, names of family members’ and their ages. Some also list their marketable 
skills, explaining why they would be a perfect candidate for one of the homes that appears to be 
offered so freely. They offer that if the poster will simply contact them, they will be happy to put 
the poster in touch with their lawyer to get the process started. The posters, who had seemingly 
offered their homes to these individuals, continue responding to others who make comments to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the tune of how much they wish they could do something to assist these people. However, all 
parties ignore the responses of the refugees completely. In the abstract, when confronted with the 
idea of assisting others, people are more than willing to do so, but when it comes time to take the 
concept out of the abstract into the practical, such offers dry up, as though they were never there 
in the first place. 
Conclusion 
 Based on the analysis of this paper, it is evident that each system whether in the Gulf, 
Europe or North America includes some gaps in regard to the rights and services it provides to 
the Syrian people. This is obvious in the issues of migration and integration that challenge the 
Syrian guests and or refugees, as well as the issues they experience with international refugee 
law and the lack of services from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Therefore, the international community must come together and uphold to their obligations 
towards refugees by implementing concrete long-term protection measures, and redefining 
international refugee law and its responsibilities towards refugees.  
 In conclusion, the forthcoming suggestions introduce some measures that if undertaken 
by the international community will help the Syrian guests and or refugees re-build their future 
and thrive in a foreign country. In addition, build more tolerance in the international community 
towards the refugees. Assisting the Syrian refugees to thrive is dependent on providing them 
with the tools, supplies, and resources necessary to move forward, returning to normal lives after 
having lived in tent cities for the past five years. First, information should be disseminated 
through all countries that are a part of the United Nations indicating how individuals of the 
general population can assist refugees. Collections can be taken up at specific drop locations for 
food, clothing, non-perishable items, school supplies, medical supplies, books, blankets, cookery, 
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and other basic components of daily life. It can be requested that every individual donate some 
money or one item. When given a low cap of this nature, the donations will start coming in 
because then it becomes competitive. People wanting to help can donate x amount or one item, 
but how many people are going to be willing to bring in x amount of items? This is the mentality 
that will take hold, and in this manner, the current state of affairs affecting the Syrian refugees 
can gradually be improved by providing them with the supplies that they need in order to thrive.  
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  France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland: draft resolution 
 
 
 The Security Council, 
 Expressing grave concern at the situation in Syria, 
 Recalling its Presidential Statement of 3 August, 
 Welcoming the Secretary-General’s statements articulating continued concerns 
about the ongoing violence and humanitarian needs, calling on the Syrian 
Government to halt its violent offensive at once, calling for an independent 
investigation of all human rights violations during recent demonstrations, and 
stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for human rights violations, 
 Noting Human Rights Council’s report of its 17th Special session 
(A/HRC/S-17/1), including the decision to dispatch an independent international 
commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human 
rights law since March 2011 in Syria, 
 Recalling the Syrian Government’s primary responsibility to protect its 
population, and the Secretary-General’s call for the Syrian Government to allow 
unhindered and sustained access for humanitarian aid and humanitarian 
organizations, welcoming OCHA’s humanitarian assessment mission and urging the 
Syrian authorities to cooperate comprehensively with the United Nations, 
 Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an 
inclusive and Syrian-led political process with the aim of effectively addressing the 
legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population which will allow the full 
exercise of fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including of the rights of 
freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful protest, and further stressing that 
such a political process can only be advanced through an environment free from any 
sort of violence, fear and intimidation, 
 Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and 
regretting the lack of progress in implementation, 
 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity and national unity of Syria, 
 Deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Syria and 
the potential for further escalation of the violence, and reaffirming the need to 
resolve the current crisis in Syria peacefully, 
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 Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and the League of Arab 
States, and all other diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing this situation, including 
those of Turkey, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, and regretting the lack of a 
substantive response by the Syrian authorities to these demands, 
 1. Strongly condemns the continued grave and systematic human rights 
violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities, and 
expresses profound regret at the deaths of thousands of people including women and 
children; 
 2. Demands an immediate end to all violence and urges all sides to reject 
violence and extremism; 
 3. Recalls that those responsible for all violence and human rights 
violations should be held accountable; 
 4. Demands that the Syrian authorities immediately: 
 (a) cease violations of human rights, comply with their obligations under 
applicable international law, and cooperate fully with the office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights; 
 (b) allow the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its 
entire population, including rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, 
release all political prisoners and detained peaceful demonstrators, and lift 
restrictions on all forms of media; 
 (c) cease the use of force against civilians; 
 (d) alleviate the humanitarian situation in crisis areas, including by allowing 
expeditious, unhindered and sustained access for internationally recognized human 
rights monitors, humanitarian agencies and workers, and restoring basic services 
including access to hospitals; 
 (e) ensure the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled the violence 
to their homes; 
 5. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an 
environment free from violence, fear, intimidation, and extremism, and aimed at 
effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population, 
and encourages the Syrian opposition and all sections of Syrian society to contribute 
to such a process; 
 6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to urge the Syrian 
Government to implement paragraphs 2 and 4 above, including by appointing at the 
appropriate time a Special Envoy in consultation with the Security Council, and 
encourages all States and regional organizations to contribute to this objective; 
 7. Encourages in this regard the League of Arab states to continue efforts 
aimed at ending the violence and promoting such an inclusive Syrian-led political 
process; 
 8. Strongly condemns attacks on diplomatic personnel and recalls the 
fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic agents and the obligations 
on host States, including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect embassy premises and prevent 
attacks on diplomatic agents; 
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 9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the direct or 
indirect supply, sale or transfer to Syria of arms and related materiel of all types, as 
well as technical training, financial resources or services, advice, or other services 
or assistance related to such arms and related materiel; 
 10. Requests the Secretary-General to report on implementation of this 
resolution within 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter; 
 11. Expresses its intention to review Syria’s implementation of this 
resolution within 30 days and to consider its options, including measures under 
Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations; 
 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
 
 
 United Nations  S/2012/77
  
 
Security Council  Distr.: General 
4 February 2012 
 
Original: English 
 
12-22375 (E)    060212     
*1222375*   
  Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:  
draft resolution 
 
 
 The Security Council, 
 Recalling its presidential statement of 3 August 2011, 
 Recalling General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/176 of 19 December 2011, 
as well as Human Rights Council resolutions S/16-1, S/17-1 and S/18-1, 
 Noting the League of Arab States’ request in its decision of 22 January 2012, 
 Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in Syria, and 
profound concern at the death of thousands of people and calling for an immediate 
end to all violence, 
 Welcoming the League of Arab States’ Action Plan of 2 November 2011 and its 
subsequent decisions, including its decision of 22 January 2012, which aims to 
achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis, 
 Noting the deployment of the League of Arab States’ observer mission, 
commending its efforts, regretting that, due to the escalation in violence, the 
observer mission was not in a position to monitor the full implementation of the 
League of Arab States’ Action Plan of 2 November 2011, and noting the subsequent 
decision of the League of Arab states to suspend the mission,  
 Underscoring the importance of ensuring the voluntary return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons to their homes in safety and with dignity, 
 Mindful that stability in Syria is key to peace and stability in the region,  
 Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and 
regretting the lack of progress in implementation,  
 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Syria, emphasizing its intention to resolve the current political 
crisis in Syria peacefully, and noting that nothing in this resolution authorizes 
measures under Article 42 of the Charter,  
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 Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and all diplomatic efforts 
aimed at addressing the situation, and noting in this regard the offer of the Russian 
Federation to host a meeting in Moscow, in consultation with the League of Arab 
States, 
 1. Condemns the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against 
civilians, arbitrary executions, killing and persecution of protestors and members of 
the media, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to 
medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, including against 
children; 
 2. Demands that the Syrian government immediately put an end to all 
human rights violations and attacks against those exercising their rights to freedom 
of expression, peaceful assembly and association, protect its population, fully 
comply with its obligations under applicable international law and fully implement 
Human Rights Council resolutions S-16/1, S-17/1, S-18/1 and General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/66/176;  
 3. Condemns all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, and in this 
regard demands that all parties in Syria, including armed groups, immediately stop 
all violence or reprisals, including attacks against State institutions, in accordance 
with the League of Arab States’ initiative;  
 4. Recalls that all those responsible for human rights violations, including 
acts of violence, must be held accountable; 
 5. Demands that the Syrian government, in accordance with the Plan of 
Action of the League of Arab States of 2 November 2011 and its decision of 
22 January 2012, without delay: 
 (a) cease all violence and protect its population; 
 (b) release all persons detained arbitrarily due to the recent incidents; 
 (c) withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, and 
return them to their original home barracks; 
 (d) guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations; 
 (e) allow full and unhindered access and movement for all relevant League 
of Arab States’ institutions and Arab and international media in all parts of Syria to 
determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents 
taking place; and 
 (f) allow full and unhindered access to the League of Arab States’ observer 
mission; 
 6. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an 
environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at 
effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, 
without prejudging the outcome; 
 7. Fully supports in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012 
decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political 
system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or 
beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the 
 S/2012/77
 
3 12-22375 
 
Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the 
League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the 
League of Arab States; 
 8. Encourages the League of Arab States to continue its efforts in 
cooperation with all Syrian stakeholders; 
 9. Calls upon the Syrian authorities, in the event of a resumption of the 
observer mission, to cooperate fully with the League of Arab States’ observer 
mission, in accordance with the League of Arabs States’ Protocol of 19 December 
2011, including through granting full and unhindered access and freedom of 
movement to the observers, facilitating the entry of technical equipment necessary 
for the mission, guaranteeing the mission’s right to interview, freely or in private, 
any individual and guaranteeing also not to punish, harass, or retaliate against, any 
person who has cooperated with the mission;  
 10. Stresses the need for all to provide all necessary assistance to the mission 
in accordance with the League of Arab States’ Protocol of 19 December 2011 and its 
decision of 22 January 2012;  
 11. Demands that the Syrian authorities cooperate fully with the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the Commission of Inquiry 
dispatched by the Human Rights Council, including by granting it full and 
unimpeded access to the country; 
 12. Calls upon the Syrian authorities to allow safe and unhindered access for 
humanitarian assistance in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
persons in need of assistance; 
 13. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s efforts to provide support to the 
League of Arab States, including its observer mission, in promoting a peaceful 
solution to the Syrian crisis; 
 14. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this 
resolution, in consultation with the League of Arab States, within 21 days after its 
adoption and to report every 30 days thereafter; 
 15. Decides to review implementation of this resolution within 21 days and, 
in the event of non-compliance, to consider further measures; 
 16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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  France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution 
 
 
 The Security Council, 
 Recalling its Resolutions 2043 (2012) and 2042 (2012), and its Presidential 
Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012,  
 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter, 
 Reaffirming also its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations 
and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of 
the League of Arab States, aimed at securing full implementation of his six-point 
plan in its entirety, as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012), 
 Condemning the Syrian authorities’ increasing use of heavy weapons, 
including indiscriminate shelling from tanks and helicopters, in population centres 
and failure to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons to their barracks contrary to 
paragraph 2 of resolution 2043 (2012),  
 Condemning the armed violence in all its forms, including by armed 
opposition groups, and expressing grave concern at the continued escalation of 
violence, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of 
people in Syria, 
 Condemning the continued widespread violations of human rights by the 
Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed opposition groups, 
and recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, 
 Condemning the series of bombings that have made the situation more 
complex and deadly, some of which are indicative of the presence of well-organised 
terrorist groups, 
 Deploring the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the failure to ensure 
timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting 
contrary to point 3 of the Envoy’s six-point plan, reiterating its call for the Syrian 
parties to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to 
all populations in need of assistance, in particular to civilian populations in need of 
evacuation, and calling upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, 
to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations 
to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
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 Condemning the continued detention of thousands of Syrians in networks of 
Government-run facilities and deploring that there is no freedom of assembly 
contrary to points 4 and 6 of the six-point plan, and recalling the urgency of 
intensifying the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, and 
reiterating the need for Syrians to enjoy the freedom to assemble, including to 
demonstrate peacefully and freedom of movement for journalists throughout the 
country, as part of the necessary conditions for a political transition, 
 Having considered the Secretary-General’s report on UNSMIS dated 6 July 
2012, commending United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 
personnel for their continued efforts in a dangerous and volatile environment, and 
deploring that, due to the failure of the parties to implement the six-point plan and 
to the level of violence, monitoring access restrictions and direct targeting, the 
Mission’s operational activities were rendered unworkable, and supporting the 
Secretary-General’s recommendation that a shift in Mission structure and focus 
should be considered, 
 Stressing that rapid progress on a political solution represents the best 
opportunity to resolve the situation in Syria peacefully, welcoming in this regard the 
Final Communiqué of the Envoy’s 30 June Action Group meeting, and noting that 
progress towards an atmosphere of safety and calm is key to enabling a credible 
transition, 
 Welcoming the Syrian Opposition Conference held under the auspices of the 
League of Arab States in Cairo on July 3, 2012, as part of the efforts of the League 
of Arab States to engage the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition, and 
encouraging greater cohesion among the opposition, 
 Noting the Secretary-General’s 6 July 2012 call on the Security Council to 
provide the necessary support and ensure sustained, united and effective pressure on 
all concerned to ensure compliance with its decisions and create conditions for the 
success of a political solution envisaged by the Action Group, 
 Determining that the situation in Syria constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, 
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 1. Expresses grave concern at the escalation of violence, and the failure of 
the parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to implement the Envoy’s six-point 
plan as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012), thus not permitting the creation of a 
political space that would allow for meaningful political dialogue, and calls upon all 
parties to recommit immediately and without waiting for the actions of others to a 
sustained cessation of violence in all its forms and implementation of the six-point 
plan; 
 2. Endorses in full the 30 June Action Group Final Communiqué and its 
underlying guidelines and principles (Annex); 
 
  Enabling Transition: Immediate implementation of the Envoy’s six-point plan 
 
 3. Demands the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of, 
all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) 
aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, 
securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition as 
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outlined in the Annex, leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which 
citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including 
through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian 
authorities and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition; 
 4. Decides that the Syrian authorities shall implement visibly and verifiably 
their commitments in their entirety, as they agreed to do in the Preliminary 
Understanding and as stipulated in resolution 2042 (2012) and 2043(2012), to 
(a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy 
weapons in such centres, (c) complete pullback of military concentrations in and 
around population centres, and to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from 
population centres to their barracks or temporary deployment places to facilitate a 
sustained cessation of violence; 
 5. Demands that all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately 
cease all armed violence in all its forms, thereby creating an atmosphere conducive 
to a sustained cessation of violence and a Syrian-led political transition; 
 6. Expresses grave concern at the increasing numbers of refugees and 
internally displaced persons as a result of the ongoing violence, and reiterates its 
appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States bordering 
Syria to assist those who have fled across Syria’s borders as a consequence of the 
violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member 
states receiving these displaced persons; 
 
  Transition 
 
 7. Demands that all Syrian parties work with the Office of the Joint Special 
Envoy to implement rapidly the transition plan set forth in the Final Communiqué in 
a way that assures the safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm; 
 
  Accountability 
 
 8. Recalls that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, 
including acts of violence, must be held accountable; 
 9. Decides that the Syrian Government shall provide the UN Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and individuals 
working on its behalf immediate entry and access to all areas of Syria, decides that 
the Syrian authorities shall cooperate fully with the Commission of Inquiry in the 
performance of its mandate; 
 
  UNSMIS 
 
 10. Decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission 
in Syria (UNSMIS) for a period of 45 days, on the basis of the Secretary-General’s 
recommendation to reconfigure the Mission to increase support for dialogue with 
and between the parties, and enhance attention to the political track and rights’ 
issues across the six-point plan; 
 11. Requests the Secretary-General to retain the minimum military observer 
capacity and requisite civilian component necessary to promote forward steps on the 
six-point plan through facilitation of political dialogue and to conduct verification 
and fact-finding tasks; 
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 12. Condemns all attacks against UNSMIS, reaffirms that perpetrators of 
attacks against UN personnel must be held to account, demands that the parties 
guarantee the safety of UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of 
movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies 
with the Syrian authorities; 
 13. Demands that the Syrian authorities ensure the effective operation of 
UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its 
personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full 
unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil 
its mandate, underlining in this regard the need for the Syrian authorities and the 
United Nations to come rapidly to an agreement on appropriate air transportation 
assets for UNSMIS; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to 
freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without 
retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS; 
 
  Compliance 
 
 14. Decides that, if the Syrian authorities have not fully complied with 
paragraph 4 above within ten days, then it shall impose immediately measures under 
Article 41 of the UN Charter; 
 
  Reporting and Follow-Up 
 
 15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the 
implementation by all parties in Syria of this resolution within 10 days of its 
adoption and every 15 days thereafter; 
 16. Expresses its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and 
to consider further steps as appropriate; 
 17. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
 
  Annex 
 
  Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria 
 
1. On 30 June 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the 
League of Arab States, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
United States of America, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab 
States), Kuwait (Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab 
States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League 
of Arab States) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the 
Action Group for Syria, chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations 
and the League of Arab States to Syria.  
2. The members of the Action Group came together out of grave alarm at the 
situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. They strongly condemn the continued and 
escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply concerned 
at the failure to protect civilians, the intensification of the violence, the potential for 
even deeper conflict in the country and the regional dimensions of the problem. The 
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unacceptable nature and magnitude of the crisis demands a common position and 
joint international action. 
3. The members of the Action Group are committed to the sovereignty, 
independence, national unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the 
violence and human rights abuses, and to facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led 
political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the 
Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their 
own future. 
4. In order to secure these common objectives, the members of the Action Group 
(a) identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of 
the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), 
including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms; (b) agreed on 
principles and guidelines for a political transition that meets the legitimate 
aspirations of the Syrian people; and (c) agreed on actions that they would take to 
implement the objectives in support of the Joint Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate 
a Syrian-led political process. They are convinced that this can encourage and 
support progress on the ground and will help to facilitate and support a Syrian-led 
transition. 
 
  Identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of 
the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), 
including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms 
 
5. The parties must fully implement the six-point plan and Security Council 
resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012). To that end: 
 (a) All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in 
all its forms and to the implementation of the six-point plan immediately and 
without waiting for the actions of others. The Government and armed opposition 
groups must cooperate with the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (UNSMIS), with a view to furthering the implementation of the plan 
in accordance with the Mission’s mandate; 
 (b) A cessation of armed violence must be sustained, with immediate, 
credible and visible actions by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to 
implement the other items of the six-point plan, including: 
 (i) Intensification of the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained 
persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons 
involved in peaceful political activities; the provision, without delay and 
through appropriate channels, of a list of all places in which such persons are 
being detained; the immediate organization of access to such locations; and the 
provision, through appropriate channels, of prompt responses to all written 
requests for information, access or release regarding such persons; 
 (ii) Ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists 
and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them; 
 (iii) Respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate 
peacefully, as legally guaranteed;  
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 (c) In all circumstances, all parties must show full respect for the safety and 
security of UNSMIS and fully cooperate with and facilitate the Mission in all 
respects; 
 (d) In all circumstances, the Government must allow immediate and full 
humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the 
fighting. The Government and all parties must enable the evacuation of the 
wounded, and all civilians who wish to leave must be enabled to do so. All parties 
must fully adhere to their obligations under international law, including in relation 
to the protection of civilians. 
 
  Agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition 
 
6. The members of the Action Group agreed on the principles and guidelines for 
a Syrian-led transition set out below. 
7. Any political settlement must deliver to the people of the Syrian Arab 
Republic a transition that: 
 (a) Offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in the Syrian 
Arab Republic; 
 (b) Establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the 
realization of that perspective; 
 (c) Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all and of stability and 
calm; 
 (d) Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence and is credible. 
8. Perspective for the future. The aspirations of the people of the Syrian Arab 
Republic have been clearly expressed by the wide range of Syrians consulted. There 
is an overwhelming wish for a State that: 
 (a) Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and 
newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also 
means that the commitment to multiparty democracy must be a lasting one, going 
beyond an initial round of elections; 
 (b) Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence 
of the judiciary, accountability of those in Government and the rule of law. It is not 
enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available 
to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority; 
 (c) Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for 
sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. 
Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected. 
9. Clear steps in the transition. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic will 
end only when all sides are assured that there is a peaceful way towards a common 
future for all in the country. It is therefore essential that any settlement provide for 
clear and irreversible steps in the transition according to a fixed time frame. The key 
steps in any transition include: 
 (a) The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a 
neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional 
governing body exercising full executive powers. It could include members of the 
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present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the 
basis of mutual consent;  
 (b) It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All 
groups and segments of society in the Syrian Arab Republic must be enabled to 
participate in a national dialogue process. That process must be not only inclusive 
but also meaningful. In other words, its key outcomes must be implemented; 
 (c) On that basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the 
legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular 
approval; 
 (d) Upon establishment of the new constitutional order, it will be necessary 
to prepare for and conduct free and fair multiparty elections for the new institutions 
and offices that have been established; 
 (e) Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition. 
10. Safety, stability and calm. Any transition involves change. However, it is 
essential to ensure that the transition can be implemented in a way that ensures the 
safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm. This requires: 
 (a) Consolidation of full calm and stability. All parties must cooperate with 
the transitional governing body to ensure the permanent cessation of violence. This 
includes completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of armed groups; 
 (b) Effective steps to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected and that 
immediate action is taken to address humanitarian issues in areas of need. It is also 
necessary to ensure that the release of the detained is completed rapidly; 
 (c) Continuity of governmental institutions and qualified staff. Public 
services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security 
services. However, all governmental institutions, including the intelligence services, 
have to perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate 
under a leadership that inspires public confidence, under the control of the 
transitional governing body; 
 (d) Commitment to accountability and national reconciliation. 
Accountability for acts committed during the present conflict must be addressed. 
There also needs to be a comprehensive package for transitional justice, including 
compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present conflict, steps towards 
national reconciliation and forgiveness. 
11. Rapid steps to come to a credible political agreement. It is for the people of 
the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a political agreement, but time is running out. 
It is clear that: 
 (a) The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the 
Syrian Arab Republic must be respected; 
 (b) The conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation 
alone. Conditions conducive to a political settlement must now be put in place; 
 (c) There must be an end to the bloodshed. All parties must recommit 
themselves credibly to the six-point plan. This must include a cessation of armed 
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violence in all its forms and immediate, credible and visible actions to implement 
points 2 to 6 of the six-point plan; 
 (d) All parties must now engage genuinely with the Joint Special Envoy. The 
parties must be prepared to put forward effective interlocutors to work expeditiously 
towards a Syrian-led settlement that meets the legitimate aspirations of the people. 
The process must be fully inclusive in order to ensure that the views of all segments 
of Syrian society are heard in shaping the political settlement for the transition; 
 (e) The organized international community, including the members of the 
Action Group, stands ready to offer significant support for the implementation of an 
agreement reached by the parties. This may include an international assistance 
presence under a United Nations mandate if requested. Significant funds will be 
available to support reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
 
  Agreed actions  
 
12. Agreed actions that the members of the Group will take to implement the 
above in support of the Joint Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led 
political process are as follows: 
 (a) Action Group members will engage as appropriate, and apply joint and 
sustained pressure on, the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to take the steps and 
measures outlined in paragraph 5 above; 
 (b) Action Group members are opposed to any further militarization of the 
conflict; 
 (c) Action Group members emphasize to the Government of the Syrian Arab 
Republic the importance of the appointment of an effective empowered interlocutor, 
when requested by the Joint Special Envoy to do so, to work on the basis of the six 
point plan and the present communiqué; 
 (d) Action Group members urge the opposition to increase cohesion and to 
be in a position to ensure effective representative interlocutors to work on the basis 
of the six-point plan and the present communiqué; 
 (e) Action Group members will give full support to the Joint Special Envoy 
and his team as they immediately engage the Government and the opposition, and 
will consult widely with Syrian society, as well as other international actors, to 
further develop the way forward; 
 (f) Action Group members would welcome the further convening by the 
Joint Special Envoy of a meeting of the Action Group, should he deem it necessary 
to review the concrete progress taken on all points agreed in the present 
communiqué and to determine what further and additional steps and actions are 
needed from the Action Group to address the crisis. The Joint Special Envoy will 
also keep the United Nations and the League of Arab States informed. 
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  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, 
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States 
of America: draft resolution 
 
 
 The Security Council, 
 Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013) and 2139 
(2014), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 
2012 and 2 October 2013, 
 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 Recalling its full endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 
which states that accountability for acts committed during the present conflict in the 
Syrian Arab Republic must be addressed,  
 Taking note of the reports of the independent international commission of 
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, mandated by the Human Rights Council to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 
in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may 
amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to 
identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, 
including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable,  
 Recalling the statements made by the Secretary-General and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights that crimes against humanity and 
war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic,  
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 Noting the repeated encouragement by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights for the Security Council to refer the situation to the International 
Criminal Court,  
 Determining that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security, 
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 1. Reaffirms its strong condemnation of the widespread violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and  
pro-government militias, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law by non-State armed groups, all committed in the 
course of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011;  
 2. Decides to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic described in 
paragraph 1 above since March 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court;  
 3. Decides also that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor, including by implementing fully the Agreement on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the International Criminal Court, pursuant to this resolution and, 
while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under 
the Statute, strongly urges all States and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor; 
 4. Demands that non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic also 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor in connection with investigations and prosecutions undertaken pursuant 
to this resolution; 
 5. Expresses its commitment to an effective follow-up of the present 
resolution;  
 6. Recalls the guidance issued by the Secretary-General on contacts with 
persons who are the subject of arrest warrants or summonses issued by the 
International Criminal Court; 
 7. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a 
State outside the Syrian Arab Republic which is not a party to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the 
Syrian Arab Republic established or authorized by the Council, unless such 
exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State; 
 8. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the 
referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection 
with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be 
borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute 
voluntarily and encourages States to make such contributions, noting the need for 
funding of expenses related to investigations or prosecutions of the International 
Criminal Court, including in connection with situations referred to the Court by the 
Security Council, as stated in General Assembly resolution 67/295; 
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 9. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within two months of the 
date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken 
pursuant to this resolution and requests the Secretary-General to circulate the report 
of the Prosecutor as a document of the Council, in advance of such briefings ; 
 10. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
 
